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The EU and the Migrant Crisis:
Risks and Challenges for an Aging Continent

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THE EU AND THE MIGRANT CRISIS: RISKS AND CHALLENGES FOR AN AGING CONTINENT

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1. INTRODUCTION

The migration crisis as it has developed mainly in 2015 has triggered heated debates throughout Europe over the risks inherent with this kind of massive population movement. Most of the arguments debated the efficiency of the asylum processing mechanism of the EU and of the EU individual countries. On the one hand the main issue was the precarious situation of the migrants, while on the other hand EU member states were concerned by the difficulties in receiving the migrating people. Nevertheless a closer look reveals that there is more to it than these two issues. As this migration seems to take a more permanent nature, Europe Union (EU) identity and unity are at stake in many different ways, while new opportunities arise as the European Union is pondering on how to rise to the challenge.

This research attempts to examine a set of parameters that make this crisis determining for the EU member states, their people and the EU as an institution. The 2016 EUROPOL report assesses that

due to the continuous rise in the number of irregular migrants entering the EU, including asylum seekers, and the increasing difficulties in accommodating them, the migration issue may remain in the focus of social discourse and media coverage for a non-foreseeable period of time¹.

Far from being just a massive movement of people seeking refuge or just a better future, this crisis could ignite tectonic scale changes. In fact it could even question the future of the EU. Depending on the way the EU governments and the EU Commission decide to act, the impact on the EU may have a permanent character. The perceptions of the EU public could either become a positive factor or vulnerability, thus it is imperative that the public is informed about the true nature and impact of this migration crisis. This research aims to set the problem on its proper basis, far from xenophobic stereotypes and without ignoring the gravity of the situation. Finally it aims to draw credible conclusions that could be used by both scholars and decision makers.

2. THE EU AND THE MIGRATION CRISIS: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

In order to examine the risks the EU faces because of the refugee crisis, one first has to define what constitutes a risk but also to comprehend the theoretical background of the “risk communication”. As described in the work of Ragnar E.

¹ <https://www.EUROPOL.europa.eu/content/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2016>, page 7

Löfstedt and Åsa Boholm, “The Study of Risk in the 21st Century”, the first studies on risk came from the need to face the risks from technological advances and compare them with their future prospects. This became especially important and salient in the case of the use of nuclear power in the 1950s². In our case it is the sophisticated political, economic and cultural structure of the EU that could be in question due to the seemingly externally “invading problem”. The set of countries comprising the EU, have been enjoying for the first time in history a lasting peace that allowed their monetary and legislative unification. Of course this can also be seen from different or opposite perspectives. It is this European integration that made such a lasting peace possible. The sum of the common principles accepted by all EU member states, is roughly described in what is usually called the European aquis, or as it is more commonly referred to with its French name: the “*aquis communautaire*”. The norms of evolving legislation, along with other notions more difficult to describe as they pertain to the domain of ethical values, form the baseline of European values³. This highly complex social and political structure needs to survive in the face of new risks and challenges.

2.1. Perceptions of Risks among EU member states

A risk is recognized to exist because someone identifies something as posing a risk to somebody or something...

...risks can be differently assessed and understood by people depending on their knowledge and experience, worldviews, cultural intuitions, trust in those communicating risk messages and role players in a risk issue

*Ragnar Löfstedt, Åsa Boholm.*⁴

To deal with common risks, there needs to be a commonly shared perception of their nature and impact among all the members of the same Union. Although most of the EU member countries are very close in having a good deal of common interests, moral values and experiences, there is significant divergence among the individual perception of risk each EU member state has. On the issue of migration, the perception of risk of EU member states depends mainly on their geographical location. For example Greece and Ireland could have different perceptions of the risks created by the arrival of refugees, as the numbers reaching Ireland are just a fraction of the numbers Greece is facing. This risk perception could also depend on whether they are a refugee-favorite destination, on the pressure from the incoming mass that they are facing, on their economic situation and last but not least, on the risk communication applied by their governments and media.

Seemingly EU citizens feel uncertainty due to a crisis development that is hard to predict when it will be over, or even if it will be over at all. In the eyes of

² Ragnar Löfstedt, Åsa Boholm, 2009 *The Study of Risk in the 21st Century*, page 1

³³ The term “European values” is mentioned as such in the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty of the EU. Source http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/introduction_en.htm

⁴ Ragnar Löfstedt, Åsa Boholm, 2009, op.cit, page 5

several of the citizens, the influx of asylum seekers and economic immigrants could get out of proportion, in a very short time. If this option is realized, they might have to face a number of involuntary risks. These risks could easily range from the deterioration of their daily life to a potential restriction of their rights. For example, EU citizens could be burdened by the sharing of overwhelmed public services, or even be forced to relinquish rights which might be in conflict with the cultural or religious customs of the arriving migrants. Moreover some also fear terrorism, difficulty to integrate increasingly rising numbers of migrants, transmission of contagious diseases and a potential rise in unemployment.

2.2. Common Goods to be Protected

Consequently EU global common goods as security, equality of the sexes, religious tolerance, freedom of movement and others are considered to be at risk. For instance, how can equality of the sexes be guaranteed in the EU member states when Muslims do not accept it, at least inside their families? More interestingly and although everyone thought that this issue was closed, borders are increasingly considered once again as a common good for the citizens of each country and for the EU in whole. There are citizen and even some governments of EU member states advocate a closure of their borders with other EU member states. As a result, EU citizens seeking to protect these common goods, are willing to take some voluntary risks to mitigate the first ones⁵: stricter rules on the freedom of movement, a compromise in the way the EU is executing its obligations towards the refugees, tighter police control and probably less democracy, at least in the form that we have seen it in the EU so far. Governments trying to avoid sending out a message of reduced competence might be tempted to impose restrictions, so far unknown at least to the youngest generations of European citizens. So far it has proven challenging to gain the critical trust of European societies, still balancing between skepticism and uncritical emotional acceptance⁶. The level of education of the EU public, along with the perception that people have about democracy, impose openness and honesty in the communication of the risks faced and the management that will follow. Secrecy is only fueling mistrust and provides fertile ground for any populists who want to exploit a situation for their own partisan benefit. That by itself is one of the risks born by this crisis – a risk against the “acquis” and the democracy that all EU citizens cherish and like to consider as granted. Risks deriving from the migration influx are complex enough. Meanwhile the relevant decisions are hard to take and to implement. Success will demand the active involvement of the EU as a whole, the EU member states’ governments and also private/individual actors.

It is imperative to understand what are the risks EU citizens and governments perceive as caused by this migration crisis. Living in democratic societies, it comes as no surprise that perceptions vary, depending on the country, social background and even political affiliation. In the heated debate over this issue there are justified or exaggerated concerns expressed. Security threats, failure of integration and a

⁵ Ragnar Löfstedt, Åsa Boholm, 2009, op.cit, pages 1,6

⁶ Ragnar Löfstedt, Åsa Boholm, 2009, op.cit, page 10

potentially negative impact on the economy, are indicative of the kind of concerns that come with migration. Real or not, these concerns constitute involuntary risks simply because they are perceived as such. What is most alarming though in the eyes of the EU citizenry is the sheer numbers of the people arriving, which unfortunately has a steeply ascending trend. In the light of this massive flow of incoming people, borders reclaim their long forgotten status as a common good to be protected. At the same time, populism and failure of EU governments to communicate the correct messages concerning this crisis allow for xenophobia and racism which directly challenge the values of the EU. This fact by itself is a threat that is already putting at risk the EU identity.

3. Methodology

The main difficulty of this study derives from the constant changes of the parameters, since the phenomenon of this migration crisis is still in progress. Random developments influence the reactions of key actors and may give the impression that the crisis is either under control or has reached a point of no return. Far from simply analyzing events in progress, unequivocal findings can be reached only if the research proceeds in the examination of the nature of the risks born by this crisis, the structural deficiencies and the long term policy of the EU. As a consequence, this study will have to carefully look at the role of EU governments, institutions and public, as well as of all the stakeholders that influence the development or the resolution of the crisis. The refugees just arriving, the second or third generation migrants living in the EU, but also the countries that can affect the migrant flow deserve a closer look. The challenge for the EU is to positively exploit lessons learned from previous mistakes in order to take the right decisions and steps that will allow it to survive a problem of that magnitude. The research will examine the decisions taken, the policies followed so far but also those that are being considered for the future as well as the processes in place. The results of these policies and processes in each domain will be scrutinized for their effectiveness.

The research will first attempt to identify the particularities of this migration crisis. To do this there is a need to resort to the fundamental EU and United Nations documents, conventions and treaties. This will clarify the fine differences of definition. This in turn will make sure that there will be no negative effects on the study from erroneous understanding of definitions. Building on this clear understanding of definitions, this current migration will be examined to answer some questions. It is important to determine if it is practically possible to distinguish refugees from immigrants. In parallel, it is crucial to determine if this crisis is temporary or if it will continue with the same or even higher migration rates in the foreseeable future. Additionally, it is equally important to know if these migrants will eventually return to their home countries or not, when and if the conditions allow it. Answering these questions will require recourse in preexisting surveys.

The following official sites and releases of the EU and international organizations (EULEX, EUROSTAT, EUROPOL, FRONTEX, UNHCR, IOM, OECD⁷) will provide additional data that guarantee the validity of the answers.

The effort to identify all the risks born by this massive migration must also answer some questions. There is a need to recognize the difference in the perceptions of risks among the citizens of each EU country. These differences of perceptions will be acknowledged through the relevant data of EUROSTAT. Additionally the research needs to examine if EU governments believe that the recent surge of terrorism in the EU is mainly due to migrants. This will be made possible through the analysis of public statements, and EUROPOL reports. As public health risks have been used in the public discourse, the research will take into account an article from a member of the Hellenic Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, in order to determine if the risk is manageable.

Apart from the perceptions of EU citizens and governments, migrants perceptions also matter and need to be examined. A PEW Research Centre survey will help determine if the perceptions of Muslim migrants about westerners and vice versa, are predominately positive or negative. Going a step further, a 2016 Independent Communications and Marketing (ICM) research study in the UK will also provide an insight on whether Muslims in the EU would prefer Shari'a law over the laws of the EU member states.

After elaborating on the nature and the main concerns of the crisis, the research will scrutinize the institutional state of the EU itself. Seeking to identify the reasons for the difficulties faced by the EU in managing the situation, the research will first go through the specific EU legislation concerning the provision of asylum and the conflicting interests that determine the reactions of the various stakeholders. This review, mainly centered around the Dublin System. will be based primarily on existing research of scholars.

The following step will focus on the EU policy concerning asylum and immigration, the deficiencies identified during its application and will further attempt to explore the reasons behind these deficiencies. The main sources to be used in this process will also come from the academic study of scholars, the public statements of decision makers and the study of the developing situation. There is a need to examine whether the EU member states have in fact a policy to protect an agreed EU overarching common good, or if they are acting as rivals trying to avoid sharing some of the burden. Following a logical pattern, the research must also examine the alternatives or even consequences for those failing to comply with the EU policy and rules. In order to contemplate all options, the research will attempt to correlate the BREXIT and the near GREXIT examples, with the cases of EU member states failing to comply with the EU decisions and rules. The hypothesis to be confirmed here is

7 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

that there are substantial centrifuge forces of the EU that could be intensified from the migrant crisis.

In the case of global or even regional powers, their status is as powerful as it is perceived to be. In that sense it is important for the research to examine the messages that the EU stance is sending both to its internal and its external audience. Official statements of the leaders of partner and rival countries will be used to determine the image projected by the EU. Additionally the closer examination of the agreement with Turkey, as well as the negotiations that led to this result, will be used in order to determine the extent of the concessions the EU was forced to make, to the detriment of its rules and EU member states (Greece) sovereign rights. The comprehensive study of these findings will help determine if whether the message that the EU is sending out, both to its internal and external audience, is a self discrediting one.

For the research to avoid biased conclusions, it is important to examine also the potential benefits from this crisis. A review of economy focused studies will help determine if there can be any economy related benefits from migration. The study of the factors conditioning these economic benefits will help the research conclude if all EU member states can benefit from the high number of migrants arriving. EUROSTAT and OECD data will be studied, while academic surveys of scholars will allow an accurate interpretation of these data.

Key to the long term management of the crisis is the successful integration of migrants in the EU societies. Although the present situation is unprecedented, the research will try to make a calculated prediction based on the experience from past efforts to integrate former migrants. Data from studies focusing on the level of integration of second and third generation of migrants living in the EU, will provide the measure of success of the process applied so far. Given the humanistic tradition of the country, the case study of Sweden will aid the research to identify potential problems, even in the case of a model country. The basic hypothesis here is that the integration process applied so far has failed

If the integration process has failed, the EU must turn back and examine if the basic assumption that migrants want to be integrated is a bogus one. The “Clash of Civilizations” theory of Professor Huntington will be checked for its applicability in this crisis. The question is if there is such a clash of civilizations and if this clash could potentially lead Muslim migrants to radicalization. Again the statistics of the PEW research centre survey and the similar one of the ICM for the UK, will provide useful input that will make the whole picture clearer.

The last domain that will be examined is demographics. The concern here is that, according to the current demographic trends and the massive arrival of migrants, some EU member states will see their indigenous population gradually being replaced by migrants. Confirming this hypothesis is a pure matter of statistics provided by EUROSTAT.

Based on the confirmation or rejection of the hypotheses set, the examination of each domain will reach a sub-conclusion. To reach the overall conclusion the research will proceed in a comprehensive analysis and re-synthesis of the partial conclusions.

4. PARTICULARITY OF THE CURRENT MIGRATION FLOW

To understand the current crisis, one must first understand its particular nature. Are we dealing with a migration crisis or a refugee one? Moreover, what makes this ongoing migration flow a crisis? To that point it is important to understand the difference between the terms “migrant”, “refugee” and “immigrant”.

4.1. Important Definition of Migrants and Realities on the Ground

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines a migrant⁸ as:

“any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of:

- *the person’s legal status;*
- *whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary;*
- *what the causes for the movement are; or*
- *what the length of the stay is.”*

It has to be mentioned that according to the UNHCR definition of “migrant”, refugees are not migrants. Under UNHCR, migrants choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons. It seems that there is no UNHCR definition that encompasses both refugees and immigrants, like the one provided by the IOM. For this reason the definitions that are going to be used in this document are the IOM ones.

According to the IOM, a refugee is a person who,

owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.

[Art. 1(A)(2) Convention relating to the Status of Refugees:14]⁹

This specific definition of a “refugee” is crucial because refugees are protected by international law. According to the UNHCR, the protection of refugees involves many aspects¹⁰:

- These include safety from being returned to the dangers they have fled;
- Access to asylum procedures that are fair and efficient and

⁸ <http://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms#Migrant>

⁹ <http://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms#refugee>

¹⁰ <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html>

- Measures to ensure that their basic human rights are respected to allow them to live in dignity and safety while helping them to find a longer-term solution.

Receiving states bear the primary responsibility for this protection.

According to the IOM, Immigration is: “A process by which non-nationals move into a country for the purpose of settlement”¹¹. Unlike refugees who cannot safely return home, immigrants face no such impediment to return. If they did, they would be categorized as “refugees”. If immigrants choose to return home, they will continue to receive the protection of their government.

Evidently, this distinction is very important for the countries that face masses of people transcending their borders. Receiving countries around the world, deal with immigrants under their own internal immigration laws and processes.

Despite the fact that there is a legal definition of who is an immigrant and who is a refugee¹², determining who falls into each category is very hard to achieve when one deals with people with no official travel documents, arriving in crowded boats, or even drowning. There can be no screening process at that point and denying entrance to illegal immigrants at the points of entry, is practically impossible under these circumstances.

For the member states of the EU, migration is not something new. For more than 200 years, most of the countries of Western Europe have been themselves countries of emigration to North and South America as well as Australia. After the end of World War II and during the economic boom, the wealthiest countries of Western Europe gradually became destinations for international migrants, mainly from the southern and the eastern countries of Europe but also from their former colonies. Western EU member states saw an increase of the flow of refugees after the end of the Cold War and the wars in former Yugoslavia. Gradually, with the improvement of the economic situation throughout the EU, almost all of the EU member states record a positive migration balance¹³.

Typically and until the recent escalation of instability throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa, the EU member states were facing a mixed immigration, where the economic immigrants outnumbered those who qualified as refugees¹⁴. Although the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq increased the refugee flow, the major recent change was caused by the beginning of the Syrian war. It would be a mistake though to assume that the reasons behind this surge in migration are limited to the recent wars in the Middle East.

¹¹ <http://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms#Immigration>

¹² Lind Dara, (14 September 2015), *Migrant vs refugee: what the terms mean, and why they matter*,

¹³ Münz Rainer, (April 2008), *Migration, Labor Markets, and Integration of Migrants: An Overview for Europe*, page i

¹⁴ OECD, Migration Policy Debates, 2015, *Is this humanitarian migration crisis different?*, page 10
<https://www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf>

4.2. Factors Influencing Migration to the EU

Some of the factors influencing migration to the EU, old or new ones, are external (push) while some others can be attributed to the EU itself (pull).

There are four main “push” factors observed¹⁵:

- First, it is the ongoing violence in a large number of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa.
- Second, the access to the neighboring countries has been restricted a radically, following the deterioration of the conditions in these countries, caused by the vast numbers of migrants.
- Third, most of those who finally make it to the neighboring countries have no access to work or cannot enroll their children in school. This constitutes a major driver of onward movements.
- Forth, the recent geopolitical changes have closed off most alternative destinations. Libya in particular was a regional hub for migrant labor before the Arab Spring. Migration Policy Institute¹⁶ estimates put the migrant worker population in the country in 2011 at close to 2.5 million, including many sub-Saharan nationals.

This leads to the conclusion that the migrant flows will continue with the same or even higher rates in the foreseeable future.

The main factor that pulls migrants towards the EU is the “open door” policy of some EU member states. According to the Oxford Living Dictionary, the “open door” policy in terms of migration can be defined as “*The policy or practice by which a country allows the free admission of immigrants or foreign imports*”¹⁷. For example, according to National Geographic Canada and Sweden are two of the countries that had adopted such a policy in the past although the situation has changed during the current crisis¹⁸. An additional factor connected with the first is the feedback provided from migrants to those wishing to migrate, informing them that countries like Germany or Sweden, grant refugee status to most Syrians who make it to their territory. In a globalized “online” world, these “success” stories spread instantaneously, along with useful information concerning the journey and the critical services available upon arrival. EU policy for the reunification of families also contributes to the increase of arrivals. Furthermore the inability of the EU member

15 Banulescu-Bogdan Natalia and Fratzke Susan, Migration Information Source, (24 September 2015), Europe’s Migration Crisis in Context: Why Now and What Next? Retrieved 1 October 2016 from <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/europe-migration-crisis-context-why-now-and-what-next>

16 “*The Migration Policy Institute is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit think tank in Washington, DC dedicated to analysis of the movement of people worldwide*”. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/about/mission>

17 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/open_door

18 Brett Line and Linda Poon (30 June 2013), *How Other Countries Handle Immigration*, National Geographic Retrieved from <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/06/130630-immigration-reform-world-refugees-asylum-canada-japan-australia-sweden-denmark-united-kingdom-undocumented-immigrants/>

states and the EU as a whole, to tackle the chaos at the European borders means that, even those who are not eligible for protection will have to follow a lengthy procedure that could enable them to continue their illegal travel through Europe.

Regardless of the reasons fueling migration, the numbers have gotten staggering and handling migrants in a human way and processing them properly has become increasingly challenging. This fact by itself is enough for the current situation to be characterized as a crisis. Of course, there are more factors, EU internal or external, that complicate matters even more.

4.3. Composition of the Migrant Flow According to their Nationality

Undoubtedly the number of Syrian or Iraqi refugees requesting asylum in each of the EU member states has dramatically increased during the recent years. Nevertheless a closer look at the data of EUROSTAT and FRONTEX¹⁹ (appendix 1) reveals that it is not just the Syrian, Iraqi or Afghan refugees that are seeking a way in the EU. These data show that in the list of countries of origin of migrants arriving in central and northern Europe, Syria is followed by Kosovo in the second place and Albania in the fourth, just behind Afghanistan, leaving Iraq in the fifth place.²⁰ Most Greeks tend to believe that most of those migrating throughout the EU are refugees due to the high number of refugees arriving on their shores. The picture in the EU member states more to the north is not the same, as the arriving migrant population consists of a mix of refugees, but also of immigrants, whose lives are not directly threatened.

The 2016 political developments in both the UK and Germany, indicate clearly that large and increasing sections of the EU public are very preoccupied with the issue of migration. Indeed these citizens do not hesitate to publicly manifest their discontent. It is of no wonder that the issue of migration was very salient if not determining in the BREXIT advocates' agenda. In the same line, the issue tops the list in the agenda of the German parties that oppose the migration policy of Chancellor Angela Merkel.

4.4. Willingness of Refugees to Eventually Return to their Country

There is a need to determine the long term evolution of the implications of the current migration trends, as well as the prospects of migrants already residing in the EU member states. One factor that needs to be taken into account is the readiness of these refugees to return back to their countries when the situation improves. The supposition that refugees would be willing to return to their countries when the situation improves, can be checked for its validity by using the results of a study

¹⁹http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctzm

²⁰ According to Banulescu et al, Migration Information Source, (24 September 2015): “*Western Balkan nationals, face extremely high unemployment and poverty rates, and have a clear economic incentive to seek entry to Europe. Roma or other minority ethnic groups that face severe and systemic discrimination in their home countries and could, in some cases, be considered grounds for refugee status represent a substantial share of those making the journey.*” Source : <http://www.migrationpolicy.org>

conducted in Denmark. This study focused on women refugees living in Denmark and their will to return to their country of origin. The survey demonstrated that, even though these women had an idealized perception of their home countries, eventually they were reluctant to return there for a number of reasons. Social security benefits and health services played a crucial role, as well as the social ties created by their family members in the host country²¹. Moreover, refugees who come from a country where all infrastructure and their properties have been destroyed, hardly express any will to return to a place where there is nothing there for them. Therefore it may be concluded that those who fled their country as refugees will be very reluctant to return and will mostly stay in the EU for good.

4.5. The Alarming Scale and Nature of this Crisis

It appears that although migrants kept coming in the EU member states for decades, this crisis is very different. What distinguishes this migration from the previous ones, is the alarming number of arrivals. concern related to this migration is found in the ways used to cross the border, that make any attempt to segregate refugees from immigrants impossible, at least at the time of their arrival. The wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan have understandably created a steady flow of refugees. Unfortunately, this wave of refugees constitutes an excellent opportunity for economic immigrants seeking their way into the EU.

Interestingly, these migrants might also come from European countries, like Kosovo, Albania, Serbia or Ukraine, but also sub-Saharan Africa. It is understandable that this crisis is not similarly perceived in the northern and in the southern EU member states. At the external border however, the numbers become staggering and the system in place makes the proper processing of migrants lengthy. This brings up one other characteristic of this crisis: the importance of speed as a determining factor. These massive arrivals create a stovepipe effect that makes the issue of asylum entitlement a secondary one, compared to the issue of the speed that is required for the application of this process. The rapid cadence of events is an alarming particularity of this crisis. Equally important is the conclusion that most of the migrants will not return to their countries of origin. That means that the impact from their staying in the EU member states will be a permanent one, with all the risks that derive from that fact.

5. RISKS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE RECEIVING COUNTRIES

5.1. Diverging Views among EU Member States

Undoubtedly, the perception of risk is assessed differently by each person, culture or nation depending on the level of education, experiences, worldviews, cultural intuitions and trust in those communicating risk messages²². It is just normal

²¹ Kristiansen Maria, Lue Kessing Linnea, Norredam Marie, Krasnik Alan, (2015), *Migrants perceptions of aging in Denmark and attitudes toward remigration. Findings from a qualitative study*, BMC Health Services Research, 15:225 DOI 10.1186/s12913-015-0901-5

²² Ragnar Löfstedt, Åsa Boholm, 2009, op.cit, page 5

that the public of the various EU member states have different perceptions of the risk attached to the refugee crisis. This fact has already been statistically recorded in the Eurobarometer report of 2015²³ (appendix 2). Indeed the immigration crisis tops the list of concerns of the EU citizens, although levels and kinds of concern among them vary. Their arguments for the reasons of this concern equally vary. For those who object receiving migrants, their arguments oscillate between utilitarianism (“we don’t have the space”), ideological identity (“an influx of Muslims threatens to denature Christian Europe or Secular Europe, depending on the country”) and the invoking of security threats (“there are jihadists hiding amongst the migrants”)²⁴.

Some of the countries that are facing economic problems and unemployment or have not yet approached the living standards of the average of the Eurozone core countries are skeptical. Notably, it is of no wonder that Baltic people, suffering a high unemployment rate (see appendix 3), and still migrating themselves to Germany and the UK seeking a better future²⁵, see the refugees as a potential rival. Democracy in these countries is still young and after four and a half decades of Soviet oppression, the population is not ready to face new challenges of a magnitude as big as the arrival of so many refugees. Still, it is difficult to understand why, for example Hungary or Slovakia, being two of the least preferred target countries for refugees, are the most adamant opponents of EU Commission and other EU member states’ efforts to harbor refugees. This fact leaves open the question of public manipulation by the media, journalists and political communication of false or exaggerated risks mainly through the mass media.

5.2. Valid Concerns Versus Populism

It would be naïve however to claim that this refugee crisis bears no risk for the societies of the EU member states. While we might discard the warning of the Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orban to other EU leader’s: “*We may one morning wake up and realize that we are in the minority on our own continent,*”²⁶ perhaps it would be wise to have a look at the Paris suburbs and the riots that broke out in 2006 and 2007.

²³ Standard Eurobarometer 83 Spring 2015, Public Opinion in the European Union, First Results, page 14

²⁴ Etienne Balibar, (24 September 2015), *Europe and the refugees: a demographic enlargement* , Retrieved from <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/etienne-balibar/europe-and-refugees-demographic-enlargement>

²⁵ In 2006, relative to population size, , the Netherlands (-2.2 per 1,000 inhabitants),11 Bulgaria (-1.5 per 1,000), Estonia (-1.4), Poland (-1.2),Lithuania (-1.1), Latvia (-1.0) and Romania (-0.5) had a negative migration balance, Source: Münz Rainer, 2008, op.cit, page 5

²⁶ Smith-Spark Laura, (5 September 2015), *European migrant crisis: A country-by-country glance*, CNN, Retrieved 06 December 2015 from http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/05/europe/migrant_crisis_country_by_country/

5.2.1. Migrants, Terrorism and Delinquency

It is indeed in these ghetto suburbs and in the illegal mosques of Paris and Brussels, where terrorist networks find fertile ground for the new generation of Islamic terrorism. One more thing worth noting is the difficult to justify the alarmingly high number of jihadists from western countries, who have taken to the arms and are currently members of Daesh²⁷²⁸. This risk had not escaped the attention of EU governments nor of the EU public²⁹.

Although terrorism has always been a problem for countries of the EU, the conflicts following the Arab Spring, and more specifically the events in Libya and Syria, along with the ongoing conflict in Iraq, provide a source of Islamic war returning veterans, of EU citizenship³⁰. In a July 2016 report on terrorism EUROPOL reveals that

an estimated 5,000 European citizens have journeyed to Syria and Iraq to take part in Jihad". Most of them reached territories under the control of the so-called Islamic State (IS) via Turkey, the so-called Balkan axis and the sea route through Greece and Italy. On the other hand, there is no concrete evidence to date that returning terrorist systematically use the flow of refugees to enter Europe unnoticed. The investigations into the 13 November Paris attacks revealed however that two of the attackers had entered the EU through Greece as part of the large influx of refugees from Syria.

(EUROPOL, 2016)³¹

Although most of the attackers came from underprivileged suburbs of western cities, the fact that two of the terrorists passed from Greece, was used to create the impression to the EU public that the number of terrorist hiding among the refugees is high. Hence the issue of current migration flows is not necessarily directly connected with terrorism. Indeed it is acknowledged that it is not the refugees that commit terrorist attacks, but returning Islamic combatants.

²⁷ According to EUROPOL "Several European jihadists hold prominent positions in IS and are likely to maintain contact with terrorist networks in their home countries". Source: EUROPOL, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016.

²⁸ Daesh is essentially an Arabic acronym formed from the initial letters of the group's previous name in Arabic - "al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham". Although it does not mean anything as a word in Arabic, it sounds unpleasant and the group's supporters object to its use. Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277>

²⁹ Standard Eurobarometer 83 Spring 2015, *Public Opinion in the European Union, First Results*:14

³⁰ According to EUROPOL "Operations abroad could be used as a tool to attract new recruits from Europe and the West in general in order to fight in Syria and Iraq. In the long run, however, one should expect the diversion of "foreign terrorist fighters" (FTFs) to other groups less targeted than Islamic State, or to jihadist battlefields other than Syria and Iraq. Islamic State militants are also expected to migrate to other fronts or return to countries of origin should the current course of events in Syria and Iraq continues". Source EUROPOL, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016.

³¹ EUROPOL, (20 July 2016), *Terrorism Situation and Trends Report 2016*, pages 7, 24.

Angela Merkel, in June 2016 stated that “*the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism, of the Islamic State (IS) is not a phenomenon that came to Germany with the refugees. Many people have traveled from Germany to Syria for training with Islamist militants*”. In June 2016 the German Interior Minister Tomas de Maiziere clarified that “*a total of more than 800 persons were believed to have gone to Syria and Iraq*”.³² Therefore it is acknowledged that EU leaders at least, do not associate the current surge of terrorism with migrants.

What seems to be a concern for the EU citizens is the possibility of these refugees being marginalized and radicalized in the same way that a part of the EU Muslim population was in the past. This radicalization is also proven by the increasing number of jihadist related attacks in the last years (see appendix 5). The issue is more of a longer than of a shorter term. What made matters worse and has put Muslim migrants under a negative spotlight, was the sexual assault incidents in Cologne and also the incidents concerning the rape of a child in a pool in Austria. What becomes clear is that there is a cultural gap between the migrants and EU citizens and there is a lot of ground to be covered before people can get over these differences. As numbers rise, the limitations of western societies for the integration of migrants become more obvious.

5.2.2. Public Health Risks

Another potential risk lies in the sphere of public health. The Hellenic Centre for Disease Control and Prevention has warned for an emerging public health risk for non endemic or low endemic countries, like the countries of the EU, for some types of diseases (MDR pathogens). Of course the issue is not a new one. Similar risks are faced from medical tourism that has greatly contributed to the importation and dissemination of *Klebsiella Pneumonia carbapenemase (KPC)* and *NDM-producing Gram-negative bacteria* in healthcare facilities in many countries. This phenomenon has detrimental effects in terms of morbidity and mortality of hospitalized patients and healthcare costs.³³

The difference in the case of this migration crisis is that migrants live in poor sanitary conditions and that it is very difficult to perform routine tests before the admission of refugees and migrants in a healthcare facility. These conditions may potentially cause massive morbidity among refugees, vaccine-preventable diseases, and contagious diseases among others. It is very important for the public health that this issue is seriously considered during the management of influx of refugees and migrants. (Kumarasamy KK, Toleman MA, Walsh TR, Bagaria J, Butt F, Balakrishnan R, et al, 2010).

³² <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-attacks-germany-merkel-idUSKCN10S256>

³³ Maltezou Helena, (2016), *Antibiotic resistance and the refugee crisis in Europe – Preemptive action is indicated*, Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease 14, pages 69-70

There are measures to be taken to mitigate the risk, which if taken preemptively could contribute positively in the effort to control the situation. Therefore the public health risk is manageable.

Nevertheless the reports on alleged cases of tuberculosis contamination of Greek military aid personnel, had a landslide effect in the media and are indicative of how fast negative perceptions over this issue are formed. The impressions that were created did not reflect the real gravity of the threat and was blown beyond proportion. Again in the issue of the plan of the Greek government to enroll migrant children to the national education system, created controversy.

Unfortunately, instead of a public communication effort to convince parents of the Greek students that all necessary vaccines had been administered to migrant children, the emphasis was placed on the determination of the government to accept migrants. Although, there were some undercurrent xenophobic voices, the locals were not properly informed and were not reassured that standards would be respected both in terms of vaccinations and in terms of academic goals. Unfortunately the whole process of accepting migrants into schools was perceived by some parents as a forcible one. Once more it became evident that measures need to take into account the concerns of the public and risks need to be properly communicated and mitigated.

5.2.3. Resisting Populism

Fortunately due to the critical mass of educated people in the EU, we also witness a clear awareness that negative action must not lead to even more negative reaction. The perception of risk posed by the rise of ultra-right parties is both real and measurable during elections. It would be a mistake to believe that, we have to trade one evil for another. Muslim communities throughout the EU feel equally threatened by the terrorist attacks in the name of Islam, as their peaceful coexistence with the rest of the society is at risk. Solidarity gestures by Muslims, like the participation in the mass dedicated to the memory of Paris terrorist attacks, were well accepted. This proves that there are still a lot of people that are increasingly worried to see their fellow citizens falling victims of populist efforts to manipulate the public. The reluctance however of the Muslim community in Malenbeck, Belgium to cooperate with the authorities, and allow the jihadists to continue hiding for weeks, has sent out an unpleasantly alarming message. It seems that, at least in some cases, the distinction between a moderate and a radical Muslim is very subtle.

5.2.4. The Migrants Point of View and Concerns

Although the issue examined is the EU citizens' perceptions of risks connected to migration, it could be worthwhile taking a look at the perceptions of the migrants themselves aspiring to be a part of the EU or of the migrants that have joined the EU societies some years back. According to surveys, all of the migrants interviewed recognize that the countries of destination have a better standard of living

with functional social services and benefits for all.³⁴ That is after all one of the main reasons that drives them to migrate to the countries of the EU and not to other parts of the world, where they could equally find shelter from persecution. For example, Sunnis could easily find refuge in Saudi Arabia and Shia in Iran. Education and job opportunities in the EU are taken as a given, as well as their religious freedom and safety.³⁵

The experience from the Greek relocation centers shows that most of the migrants are very familiar with the rights that they can claim from the host nation. Indicative of this is the fact that returns of migrants to Greece have been put on hold following the decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and European Court of Human Rights (ECofHR), on the cases of refugees against Greece, Belgium and Austria^{36, 37}. Additionally, even the less educated among migrants receive a fairly good set of advice from their hastily elected leaders, social media or sympathizers³⁸. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether they are conscious of climatic realities or of conditions and of the hardships of living in western metropolitan downgraded suburbs.

The issue of linguistic skills doesn't rank high in their list of worries as they hope that the assistance of relatives or fellow migrants will be sufficient for their basic needs. And at some point they are right. As an evidence of the success of this plan, is the way Middle Eastern and African former migrants in the EU live on a daily basis in the ghettos created. Migrants usually come together and live in specific suburbs where they can form a kind of community with people from the same national or religious origin. In these suburbs, they can get by, speaking only their mother language, as well as find much needed support in their first steps in a foreign country.

It is just normal that these people choose to join communities where they are more likely to feel at home, given the fact that all those who are granted asylum by one EU state, are free to move inside the Schengen area states. It is clear that ghettos are an obstacle to successful integration and this is why EU states adopt policies to avoid them. Unfortunately though, it is also the natural linguistic and religious barrier that migrants put between themselves and the people of the host

³⁴ According to the Migration Policy Institute in 2015 “*With few opportunities to resume a normal life or economic self-sufficiency in first-asylum countries, and little hope that conditions will improve in the future, many Syrians are choosing to search for their own solutions in Europe*” Source . <http://www.migrationpolicy.org>

³⁵ According to a 2015 Kings College study “*People fleeing armed conflict in the Middle East migrate to Europe because they see Europe as a place of peace and wealth compared to the violence and despair that characterise their home countries*”. (Eugenio Lilli, department of war studies, 2015) Source:<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11845205/Why-do-refugees-and-migrants-come-to-Europe-and-what-must-be-done-to-ease-the-crisis.html>

³⁶ Antoniou Aikaterini, Papaioannou Alexanrda, *Ethniko kai Kapodistriako Panepistimio*, 2016, *Oi Kanonismoi Doublino II kai Doublino III* , page 11

³⁷ In December 2016 the EU Commission has decided that Greece should return to the full Schengen Status, allowing the return of migrants from the other EU countries. This measure however concerned the migrants that arrived in Greece and the EU after the agreement reached with Turkey. It is however questionable what will happen if the agreement with Turkey collapses.

³⁸ No Border, Thessaloniki, (2016), No Border Thessaloniki, *Legal Guide*, <http://noborder2016.espivblogs.net/el/legal-guide/>

countries that create integration problems which lead to division. The largely Muslim dominated Paris and Brussels suburbs are a proof of how things could also evolve after this wave of massive migration.

The effect of dense concentration of people of the same religious or national group, comes at a price. For example, in a survey conducted by ICM Research, in 2016, in the UK for Channel 4, 23% of British Muslims said Islamic Sharia law should replace British law in areas with large Muslim populations.³⁹

These alarming findings indicate that there is a undercurrent cultural issue. It is logical for any government to try to limit or even ban practices that are in conflict with or question the moral standards of a society. For instance the practice of forced marriage of under aged girls, acceptable in some cultures and countries, cannot be seen just as a custom. Undoubtedly it cannot be accepted in the EU. It clearly violates EU's human rights, moral as well as legal standards. However, using cultural issues as a pretext for action against anything that it is different from the norm, is also controversial and dangerous. For example, the case of the French ban of the scarf in public schools and the burkini in some beaches of southern France is indicative of risks for authoritarian stances and of the dilemmas presented.

If one wears a scarf because showing of a woman's hair is immoral, automatically all women who don't wear a scarf are classified as immoral, at least in the eyes of Muslims. This divides the world into the moral Muslims and the immoral believers of other religions. This cannot be acceptable in the public schools of a secular country that does not allow any manifestation of religious or moral exemption. Usually, it is the majority that sets the standards of morality and legitimacy. However, discrimination against ethnic or religious groups that practice customs without violating any law or moral standard, is unjustified as well. If wearing the traditional Indian turban is allowed because it is considered to be the custom of Indians, why should the scarf be banned? Once again the issue of setting the moral standards of a society is present and indisputable. Is this in line with the values of the EU? It seems that it is more a matter of perceptions than of morality. In this headscarf example, some people, depending their perception over Muslims, may consider it as a custom, while some others might see it as a manifestation of higher morality. Governments should be quick enough to prevent harmful perceptions from flourishing. The oxymoron is that it is not about the perceptions of risks that migrants bring, but instead it is about the risk created by the false perceptions of migrants or about migrants.

The main question that one can crystallize from this analysis is a fundamental one: is it the host countries that need to change in order to welcome the migrants, or it is the migrants that need to change and get accustomed to the country

³⁹ Kern Soeren, (17 April 2016), *UK: What British Muslims really think*, Retrieved from <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7861/british-muslims-survey>

that they chose to be their new home? Perhaps it is perceptions about each other and about oneself that need to change. One indicative fact about negative perceptions and the paradox that goes with them is illustrated in the 2016 PEW research centre survey by Michael Lipka in appendix 4.

In this survey, negative perceptions are registered on both sides, though it is of interest that it is the Muslim migrants perception of westerners that is more negative. Muslims have this perception despite the fact that it is them who have benefited most from their arrival in the host country. Additionally, although almost half of westerners have some positive perceptions about Muslims, as being honest (51%) and generous (41%), Muslims have respectively mostly negative perceptions about westerners. Apart from a 44% that thinks that westerners are respectful of women, only one third of Muslims have a positive perception of westerners (33% honest, 31% tolerant, 29% generous). These figures clearly indicate that Muslim migrants and westerners have mutually negative perceptions about each other. Bearing in mind that this specific survey did not refer to migrants that have just arrived, but to people that are permanently living in the western countries, it is evident that the integration process has not been as successful as it was hoped. Although this is a negative sign, it could also be an indication of what needs to be changed, at least at the level of communication campaigns.

5.2.5. Looking at the Big Picture

The questions that the EU as a whole and EU member states individually are facing are numerous: Can we design policies that will normalize the presence of migrants in the host countries? Even more importantly, can we implement these policies successfully? Can we convince migrants that living in a new country presupposes a change of lifestyle and different lifelong practices? Can EU governments stage public communication campaigns that will fight malicious influence both wards to the EU public and the migrants? Additionally: can we overcome our negative side? Can we reaffirm those EU citizens that still face a precarious situation and are constantly struggling to make it through the day that the refugees are not a real threat? Can we control the beast of nationalism that has in the past devoured two generations of the Continents' youth whose elimination was one of the goals of the early European unification efforts? Is it just the migrants that are questioning our identity?

Perceptions of risks vary among the various stakeholders to the problem. These differences in perceptions mirror the different background and problems faced by each country, national, religious and socioeconomic group. This massive migration of refugees or of immigrants however, constitutes a concern for all EU citizens. The fact that these concerns may range from the most extreme to the most valid ones, indicates that the debate over this crisis constitutes fertile ground for populists who grab the opportunity to use it as a pretext for xenophobia and racism.

The legitimacy of some arguments however cannot be questioned. The integration, in which western societies had so much invested on, seems to be

failing at least in some cases. A considerable section of former migrants, as well as their descendants (second and third generation), are still living in ghettos and present signs of radicalization. Although the terrorist attacks in Paris were not perpetrated by recently arrived refugees or immigrants, the fact that these actions were committed by Muslims that were born and raised in the EU, demonstrates exactly that the integration process has and could fail again. EU citizens fear that the culture of the new migrants, quite distinct from their own, will prevent them from integrating into their societies.

On top of that, recent delinquency incidents involving migrants have caused negative impressions. Perceptions also matter regarding the issue of public health. The EU standard of public health services could very well guarantee that all health risks are contained.

Unfortunately the level of public communication of the risks associated with migrants and the measures taken to mitigate the impact, has proved regrettably poor. For example, the public seems to be more concerned about the possibility of an epidemic rather than focusing on the actions to be taken in order to improve the living conditions of migrants, which is the source of the risk. That was especially evident in the case of migrant pupils in Greek schools. This example also demonstrates another failure of the communication strategy, at least of the Greek government, which focuses on short term issues ignoring important long term risks.

A well planned communication campaign strategy should focus on the risks that Greece and EU as a whole would take, if they neglected to provide proper education to migrant children. Sentiments of social exclusion, anger and lack of integration will eventually lead to radicalization. The EU cannot afford to lose this generation of migrant children.

Luckily, there is a critical mass of EU public that still resists populism and tries to manage the risk. Moderate EU Muslims are also contributing positively in maintaining intercultural peace. Arriving migrants, fleeing dire security or economic conditions, appear to be willing to integrate. Unfortunately, they usually follow failed practices of the past, which lead them to social segregation, or to join ghettos where they can find solutions to their short term needs, compromising however their long term prospects. The Paris suburbs are indicative of the situation in which Muslim migrants could find themselves if they choose to remain in the ghettos.

Instead of converging, cultures seem to be diverging. The limit between cultural and religious freedom from the one side and the western moral but also the Law from the other, is challenged. Recent surveys indicate that Muslim immigrants that made it to the EU member states in the past are dominated by negative perceptions about westerners and vice versa. It is evident that there is a lot of work to be done in the domain of public communication campaigns. Perceptions of westerners and Muslim migrants need to be protected from malicious influences. Although there is an effort to improve the living conditions of migrants and also improve the intercultural dialogue, the effort will be a success story only if it is

coupled with efficient public communication campaigns. These campaigns will help to defeat negative stereotypes and facilitate positive perceptions. The volume of the current migration flow does not leave any doubts: the EU and EU member states need to do it right this time.

6. EUROPEAN UNION POLICIES AND PROBLEMS FACED SO FAR

6.1. The Legal System and its Deficiencies

The members of the EU have different “legislative traditions” concerning the means and the processes for examining the petitions for the provision of international protection. Nevertheless, there has been a significant effort to form common values and principles with the goal of setting the foundation of a European Legislation for the Provision of Asylum.

6.1.1. History of the Dublin System

The first basic legal document treating the issue of granting asylum, was the Geneva Convention dated 28th July 1951, concerning the Status of Refugees⁴⁰. All the countries members of the EU have acceded to this convention. This convention was complemented by the New York Protocol dated 31 Jan 1967, where for the first time the principle of the non-refoulement was established.

One of the most important milestones in the development of a European Policy on Asylum, was the European Council Summit (ECS) that took place in Tampere, Finland, on the 15 and 16 October 1999, just after the end of the wars in former Yugoslavia. During this summit it was decided that the EU must work for the creation of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), based on International Law and mainly on the 1951 Geneva Convention. It was also decided that the Union, faithful to the value of solidarity, should become capable of responding to the human needs of asylum seekers. The first stage goal was the harmonization of the asylum legislation of the member states, at least at a minimum acceptable set of common rules.

The goals set at the Tampere Summit however, were never achieved due to the decision making process that existed at the time, which before the Lisbon Treaty was based on unanimity. In the same spirit, although its goals were less specific, the “Hague Program” was approved by the European Council on the 5th of November 2004. Among others, it envisioned the establishment of common procedures on asylum matters. Specific attention was paid in an effort to create a common administrative procedure for the processing of asylum requests⁴¹.

The first EU document on asylum matters was the Dublin Convention which was signed on the 15 June 1990 between 12 European Economic Community member states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom. In 1997 Austria and

⁴⁰ <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10>

⁴¹ Antoniou Aikaterini, Papaioannou Alexanrda, 2016, op.cit, page 4

Sweden also signed the Convention while Finland finally joined in 1998. In this Convention it is recognized that refugees are entitled to asylum, but has not the right to choose the country which is going to grant this asylum.

In 2003, the EU replaced the Dublin Convention with the Dublin II regulation. The aim of this regulation was to routinely identify as early as possible in the process, the member state which is responsible for the examination of each request for asylum. Additionally, the regulation detailed the reasonable deadlines for each phase of this identification procedure. It was acknowledged that the achievement of these goals would be impossible to be implemented only by the member states themselves. Therefore the EU was foreseen to be able to introduce measures in line with the fundamental principle of assistance.

The Dublin II regulation was modified by the Dublin III one, on January 2014. The goal of this modification was to restrict abuses of the asylum system. Dublin II and III regulations, the “Eurodac” regulation for the registration of illegal migrants and for the determination of the country of first entry, and the FRONTEX regulation are known as the “Dublin System”⁴².

6.1.2. Reasons for the Adoption of the Dublin System

The reason behind the establishment of the Dublin System was to resolve a set of problems that had been observed before the entry of these documents in effect. In principle, the basic priority and policy was for the countries that host the largest communities of refugees and immigrants, like the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and France to suffer less from the pressure caused by migration. This pressure was ever increasing, as most of the migrant considers that the quality of life in these countries is higher than in the southern EU member states. Consequently, they want their request to be examined by these northern countries or even a specific one (“asylum shopping”).

Another issue that needed to be regulated, was the phenomenon of refugees submitting multiple asylum requests in various countries. By exploiting that legal window, asylum candidates aimed either in increasing their chances of being granted asylum or in prolonging the process and consequently staying in the EU (“refugees in orbit”)⁴³.

6.1.3. Deficiencies of the Dublin System and Recent Attempts to Improve it

It is evident that the common point that remains unchanged in both regulations, is the principle that, responsible to carry the burden of examining the request for asylum, is the country of first entry. However, following the sharp increase in the arrivals of migrants, the EU member states in the South have carried a disproportionate burden. This in turn has led to a recurring request to change that rule.

⁴² Antoniou Aikaterini, Papaioannou Alexanrda, 2016, op.cit, page5

⁴³ Antoniou Aikaterini, Papaioannou Alexanrda, 2016, op.cit, page 5

The European Commission, acknowledging this inequity, tries to push forward new rules that could ease, up to a point, the overburdening of the EU member states located at the EU borders and the pressure of coping with high number of asylum seekers. The most important proposed rule was the possibility of suspending the return of migrants to the countries of first arrival. The rule is to be activated when the asylum system of country of first entry is under intense pressure, and the EU Commission decides that the situation created may jeopardize the asylum seekers human rights.

Although, at first glance, the main priority of the EU Commission and the EU states is the protection of the asylum seekers' rights and a more equitable sharing of the burden, a more scrutinizing look might prove otherwise. There is a clear conflict between the EU member states of the North and the South over the issue of burden sharing and the proposal of the EU Commission is nothing more than a conciliating one. This proposal makes sure that the basic rule of the responsibility belonging to the country of first entry remains unchanged, while at the same time it is put on hold. Indicative of this internal conflict is that during the discussions in the various bodies for the revision of the Dublin II regulation, no country other than Greece, Italy, Malta and Cyprus, wanted to change this rule which proved to be the major source of problems and of the overburdening of these four countries.⁴⁴

The countries of the South invoked the article 80 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU and tried to press towards the adoption of more balanced and fair measures. What has not yet become understood is that the problem of migration and asylum is neither purely national nor locally encountered in the periphery of the Union. One could even claim that it is not even an EU problem, but a world-wide one. Only through a system that would face this problem as a common EU problem and only through the creation of the mechanism of obligatory sharing of the burden, this pressure could be relieved.

Unfortunately the problem is seen as a legal one and not as a political one. Yet it would be useful to remember that it was a similar political volition to protect the northern countries that led to the initial Dublin II regulation. From the southerners' point of view, their countries were not given a fair deal with the Dublin II regulation. The need of the northern countries to be protected from the flows of migrants was never balanced with any system that would also protect the southern countries in case of crises like the one of 2015. It seems less like a burden sharing and more like a burden dumping into the backyard of one's neighbor⁴⁵.

There could be a light of hope, from the adoption of article 33 of the Dublin III regulation. In that article an explicit legal basis was established, granting the EU Commission the right to take decisions, like the triggering of an Early Warning and Preparedness and Asylum Crisis Prevention mechanism, after consulting European Asylum Support Office (EASO), in particular in situations of particular

⁴⁴ Antoniou Aikaterini, Papaioannou Alexanrda, 2016, op.cit. page 17

⁴⁵ Antoniou Aikaterini, Papaioannou Alexanrda, 2016, op.cit. page 17

pressure. The adoption of this article was another attempt of the EU Commission to bridge the gap between the northern and southern countries. Unfortunately the success of this article cannot be taken for granted as there is no provision for the recommendations of this mechanism to be obligatory for any member state⁴⁶.

However, what has been adopted in the Dublin III regulation, was the change in the provision that considered all EU member states as incontestably safe and as providing humane conditions of living for all migrants. Even that was not based on good will but rather on two previous court decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)⁴⁷ and the European Court of Justice⁴⁸. According to those two decisions it is now acknowledged that an EU country may suffer from systemic deficiencies in its asylum system, which may result in living conditions for refugees that are considered as inhuman or degrading.

In short, even if, during the course of examining an asylum request, any northern country finds out that another country should examine the request, it is not allowed to return the migrants to the country responsible, if humane conditions for the migrants are not guaranteed. In the past all EU member states were considered safe and returns could proceed regardless of the real conditions. Now, following the Dublin III amendment of Dublin II, it is the sending countries which have to make sure that the receiving countries can provide the conditions needed.

This is particularly important for countries like Greece, which for months kept receiving thousands of migrants per day and faced the collapse of their migrants processing system. One must remember that the existing systems and infrastructure were designed to meet much smaller needs and never had the throughput that could guarantee the wellbeing of such a high number of migrants. Eventually, in a situation of massive arrivals, conditions deteriorate well below the standards set and the return of migrants from other countries to Greece has to stop.

6.1.4. Realities of the Dublin System on the Ground

It becomes evident that in the case of the makeshift camp of Eidomeni, EU governments felt that there was something more at stake for them, apart from the pure interest for the wellbeing of migrants stuck there,. And indeed it is the conditions that migrants face in the relocation camps in Greece that forced the German government to cease any returns of migrants to Greece. In essence it is not possible for countries like Germany, to return illegal migrants back to the countries of first entry like Greece As a consequence, although there was a specific agreement and quota for the relocation of refugees from Greece to other EU member states, thus helping to improve the conditions in Greece, these countries seem reluctant to fully implement the terms of the agreement which largely remains in paper.

⁴⁶ Antoniou Aikaterini, Papaioannou Alexanrda, 2016, op.cit, page 17

⁴⁷ ECtHR-W.S.S vs Belgium and Greece, Application No 30696/09, date of decision 21/01/2011

⁴⁸ European Court of Justice N. S. (C-411/10) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M. E. and Others (C-493/10) v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform.

Conclusively, it is clear that although the EU is based on the set of common values described in the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty, the legal framework that was adopted was not commonly appreciated by all EU members. The repeated amendments of the Dublin System, prove beyond any doubt its deficiencies, but also the incapacity of the EU member states to reach a commonly agreed solution based on solidarity and fairness. Although officially the EU Commission and the EU member states make decisions common for all, it seems that member states are still reasoning in individual terms. On the one hand, the countries of the North, based on their economic supremacy over the South, push and finally impose regulations far from fair. The mere reference to an asylum responsibility solely attributed to the countries of first entry, is implying that the arrival of migrants is the fault of the countries at the border. The adoption of this legal provision denies the fact that these migrants are fleeing either threatening situations or extreme poverty. It also denies the fact that it is the wealth and the high standard of living in the northern countries that attracts migrants. On the other hand, the countries of the South, having their backs against the unforgiving legal obligations of a Dublin System designed to meet the needs of the North, are exploiting every window of opportunity that they get, in order to change the situation both legally but also on the ground. The EU is de facto divided.

6.2. The EU Policy and its Effectiveness

6.2.1. EU Member States Diverging Policies

Despite all disagreements among EU member states, it seems that, in general, the EU remains loyal to the principles of the protection of refugees, even to the detriment of the national interests of certain states or the concerns of some of the EU public. More interestingly the EU, being a multinational union, has not yet a clearly defined set of the “EU overarching public interests” since there is great difficulty in depicting them as such, as in the case when referring to the US or Russia.

The agreement between the EU and Turkey for the return of illegal migrants, can be seen as a rare example of an issue that was placed as the highest priority for the Union but also for the individual EU member states. Although not all EU member states agree in receiving specific quotas of migrants, the EU Commission managed to conclude an agreement where Turkey is considered as a country safe enough for the return of migrants. In this case, EU member states have chosen not to voice any individual concerns on the issue and support the effort of the EU Commission for the greater good of the EU. This is indicative of what could be achieved if the EU member states had a clear set of priorities and strategic goals.

In short, the EU member states cannot yet agree on their common interests which they would be determined to defend at all costs, even by applying a loose interpretation of the International Law concerning refugees. Finally, it would be useful to note that, during the crisis of the “Arab Spring”, notably in Libya and Syria, but also during the conflict in the Ukraine, the EU goals were not concrete, lacked vision and the policy implemented was more connected to the US policy instead of

being a policy based on EU interests. The recent attempt of the High Representative of the EU Federica Mogherini to include a specific list of the EU vital interests, in the EU Global Strategy (EUGS)⁴⁹ document, is a breakthrough on its own and could be a reflection of a new approach. Ideally in this document “*There is no clash between national and European interests*” especially since these interests are generic in nature. Nevertheless, strategies have to be translated into sub-strategies, policies and action to achieve their objectives and this is the point where the differences of national interests might be revealed. In short these strategies need to be followed by commonly agreed tactics and this is the trickiest part. As Shun Tzu taught us: “*Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory and tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat*”⁵⁰. Both the EU Commission and the EU member states need to plan their next steps.

One of the common goods globally enjoyed in the EU, is the unrestricted freedom of movement within the Schengen Area, granted since 1985 to all the citizens of the Schengen Area members. It has to be noted that the UK is not a part of the Schengen Area. This freedom of movement though is not unrestrictedly granted to all people. Although restricting humans from their dream of a better future is unpleasant, the Schengen Area was not designed to provide a better future for all people indiscriminately. The freedom of movement of economic immigrants is restricted and even refugees seeking asylum, have to follow a process that so far has been lengthy. Nevertheless, EU member states, in normal situations have no border control mechanisms between them and virtually anyone, EU citizen, migrant or refugee, having crossed the EU external borders can pass from the one EU state to the next one without any restrictions. Although some member states have used their right to exempt themselves from the Schengen Area rules for reasons of security, this is only allowed in extremis and on a temporary base.

Even worse, this migrant crisis has accentuated the shortcomings of an EU policy which was not designed to meet urgent situations are evident. Migrants or refugees embarking on this perilous trip over the Aegean in dingy rubber boats and risking their lives in cramped lorry containers, find themselves being greeted by governments that can't agree on how, or if, to welcome them.⁵¹

The migration has raised doubts about open borders, while sparking a dispute over sharing the burden. At the EU points of entry many migrants claim to be of Syrian origin. A later screening process of some of the migrants revealed however, a high number of falsely claimed nationalities to avoid returning. Obviously the inability to accurately identify the nationality of migrants who are crossing the border and travelling within the limits of the EU is a source of concern for the EU internal security. This is especially true in times of increased Islamic terrorist threat. Despite

⁴⁹ The EUGS identifies five priorities: (1) the security of the EU itself; (2) the neighbourhood; (3) how to deal with war and crisis; (4) stable regional orders across the globe; and (5) effective global governance. Source: <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/SPB75.pdf> page 2

⁵⁰ <http://www.davidbrim.com/sun-tzu-lessons-on-strategy/>

⁵¹ Financial Times, (4 September 2015) *What is the Europe migrant crisis and how has it evolved?* <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/cdd88362-524e-11e5-b029-b9d50a74fd14.html#axzz3xgj1sZ>

the established and functioning Eurodac system, the large scale use of the system in situations of mass influxes can rapidly overcome the terminal system's capacity on the ground. In the course of this migration crisis, EU member states promised to dispatch specialized personnel and equipment to the external borders, but the number of systems and specialized personnel finally arriving at the points of entry was very low. Although Greece was promised some hundreds of experts, the total number that has reached Greece by mid October was 32.

Even worse, EU member states have been slow to take advantage or share additional existing records that were available even for migrants that were officially registered at the EU external border. Unfortunately, EU governments have not yet adopted a solid and unified information policy on the issue that would help in the management of this risk as it is perceived by their citizens.

Most refugees and immigrants are openly stating that their goal is to reach the developed and rich countries of the north, with Germany being at the top of their list. A number of EU member states however have refused to receive any refugees and some transit countries have even voiced their concern over their unrestricted movement. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, who form an informal grouping known as the "Visegrad Four" or V4, rejected any compulsory refugee quotas and are also concerned by the mass movement through their borders. It appears that these newly admitted countries feel less confident in the face of rising issues, than Germany for instance that has institutions that have proven their effectiveness through time. The same is also valid for their societies that are still trying to get accustomed to the evolving provisions of the "acquis communautaire".

6.2.2. The Negative Impact of Policy Deficiencies

There is no doubt that that in a perfect world, enforcing EU rules on the movement of undocumented migrants should be a priority. Ideally, illegal migrants should not be allowed to decide where they would like to go, as this would set a bad precedent that would send out a wrong message. Both the EU public and migrants need to receive the right message. Although it is clear that tougher regulations lead to higher levels of trust from the side of the public⁵², these tougher rules must however be well founded and properly explained. To that point, it is alarming to see that under the pretext of EU rules, preexisting xenophobia and nationalism are on the increase in some countries and for the first time since the end of the Cold War, fences are erected to keep people out.

Quite surprisingly, some EU member states seem determined to go to extremes in order to deter the arrival of refugees and immigrants. The recent decision of Denmark to confiscate all personal items, exceeding specified value, as well as money, from the arriving migrants, is indicative of the decline of the EU values, as described in the Constitutional Treaty of the EU. This is even more alarming when

⁵² Ragnar Löfstedt, Åsa Boholm, 2009, op.cit, page 13

this happens in a country which once was a symbol of openness and direct democracy.

What is also of concern is that even in some countries with an integration culture, like Germany, society seems to be divided between those who welcome refugees and those who would like to keep them out⁵³. The level of these reactions varies from peaceful demonstrations and the “protest vote” against Chancellor Angela Merkel during the regional elections, to targeting refugee shelters. Once again, old trends and practices are making their way back from a chapter of European history that everyone would prefer to forget.

However it is also the behavior of some of the refugees that seems to fuel xenophobia. The recent sexual assault incident in some of the EU cities, on the New Years’ Eve, and the attempt of the German government to downplay the Cologne case, resulted in a backlash that eventually forced the government to consider stricter migration rules. The secrecy that characterized the handling of the Cologne case by the police, created mistrust that put under scrutiny the refugee policy of the Chancellor Merkel. Yet the German door remains open, at least at the level of public statements.

In general, old EU member states like France, Germany or Sweden that had in the past received large numbers of immigrants were, at least initially, more open and advocated a more generous policy towards refugees, thus recognizing EU member states’ obligations. Despite the fact that Sweden has re-established border controls with Denmark, this move is not intended to block all refugees but rather regulate an otherwise uncontrolled flow. According to the German and French vision the EU should establish a permanent and mandatory welcoming mechanism that will regulate migrant flows. French President Francois Holland, has reminded with a reprimanding tone that: *“Europe is a group of principles, of values which oblige us to welcome those who are pushed out and look for refuge because they are persecuted.”*⁵⁴ Again the issue of the EU public culture and past experiences appears to be fundamental in the perception of the risk.

Clearly the EU is facing some new risks that are just triggered by the migration crisis, but goes deeper than that. The mass influx has exposed a long-simmering east-west divide within the EU and as a first sign has called into question the EU’s open-border arrangements. Is the Schengen Area under threat? The sharp reaction of the Lithuanian EU Commissioner in 2015, who used harsh comments to describe the situation on Lesbos Island, for which Greece has been protesting for a long time, was followed by the proposal of the President of the College of EU Commissioners to suspend the Greek membership in the Schengen Area. These are probably steps that could open the Pandora’s box. The Hungarian Prime Minister has been fast to attack Germany by saying that *“this is a German problem”*.⁵⁵ He has also

⁵³ Standard Eurobarometer 83 Spring 2015, *Public Opinion in the European Union, First Result*, page 39

⁵⁴ Smith-Spark Laura, 2015, op.cit.

⁵⁵ Smith-Spark Laura, 2015, op.cit.

attacked Greece by frequently making vitriolic comments on the ability of the Greek government to seal the sea borders in the Aegean sea from this massive wave of misery sailing from the Turkish coast.

Unfortunately comments and practices of the short do not do any good in portraying the EU united in the face of difficulties. The longstanding idyllic perception of EU member states bound by shared values and solidarity, suddenly appears to be challenged or even destroyed. The risk is bigger than realized: if the Schengen Area is touched, even in the form of Greece leaving it temporarily, the whole EU structure will be questioned. The EU still struggles to get over the Greek economic crisis and has just managed to avoid a much feared GREXIT. The impact however can still be felt and bitter scars are still visible.

In that context the 2015 initiative of Austria to call for a meeting of the Western Balkan countries – mainly not EU members, while Greece was intentionally excluded, led to the closure of the borders of Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to all immigrants and refugees. This highly questionable and arbitrary initiative finally forced the EU Commission to officially declare the western Balkan corridor as “closed to all immigrants and refugees”. Greek EU border guards eventually, found themselves witnessing illegal refolements of migrants back to Greece, conducted by a third country under the eyes and the guidance of other EU member states policemen. It seems that the principle of EU members’ consensus previously respected in the Union became obsolete overnight in the face of purely national or even regional interests.

From a burden sharing perspective, the countries which impose restrictions on asylum claims and entitlements to basic needs, including access to health care, increase the pressure on refugees to migrate to more liberal countries. This was verified by the findings of surveys conducted in Germany, examining the concentration of migrants in the various Federal States, in correlation with the rights that these states granted to migrants (Kayvan Bozorgmehr 2016). Without the much needed super national framework, this free-riding behavior becomes rational: countries with restrictive policies benefit from the investment made by less restrictive countries in migrant relief programs. Unless refugees are assured the same basic conditions wherever they arrive, movements across the borders of the EU member states will continue regardless of relocation quota. Unfortunately it appears that some EU member states are more interesting in avoiding the burden than assisting EU partners.

To make things worse the referendum in the UK deciding the exit of the country from the EU seems to have opened a whole new chapter in the history of EU crises. It should not escape the attention of the EU citizens that the risk faced is a fundamental one: a new EU unity crisis could be decisive for the EU vision as a whole. Usually institutions are easier to attack and deconstruct than to construct.

6.2.3. Overall Evaluation of the Current EU Policy

In sum, it becomes evident that an in-depth list of “EU vital interests” requires more work. Unfortunately, the recent crisis has proven that there is a shortcoming in the domain of a common foreign and security policy and in this case, on the issue of migration. Even after the release of the EUGS document the strategy for migration is not yet coupled by tangible steps. It is still evident that the system and policy in place for handling asylum requests as well as handling illegal migrants was not designed to cope with massive arrivals. The urgency of the situation along with the difficulties faced, created a dispute over the sharing of the burden. Deciding who is entitled to an asylum among so many people, proves difficult in absence of travel documents. Despite promises, urgently needed support has not reached the EU borders and information sharing among the security services needs to be more efficient. Evidently EU governments have yet to adopt a comprehensive policy that will help in the management of risks caused by this crisis.

The recent initiative of the European External Action Service in June 2016 to issue a breakthrough document describing the “Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, can be seen as a step to the right direction. In this strategy there are numerous references to the issue of migration. It is emphasized that:

*“We must become more joined-up across internal and external policies.... We will also make different external policies and instruments migration-sensitive – from diplomacy and CSDP to development and climate – and ensure their coherence with internal ones regarding border management, homeland security, asylum, employment, culture and education”*⁵⁶.

European External Action Service

It should not be overlooked that this EU Global Strategy was an initiative of the European External Service. It will prove crucially to see if the EU Member States will feel ownership of the EUGS. The High Representative Federica Mogherini, will obviously drive implementation, but if it is only her, it cannot work. And implementing this ambitious Strategy will demand a serious drive⁵⁷.

Clearly the EU is facing some new risks that although triggered by the migration crisis, go deeper than that. Although members of the same Union, EU member states seem more divided than united. Accusations and threats that countries will be expelled from the Schengen Area have been routinely used, in a blame game that seeks to find the guilty who will have to carry both the blame and the burden. Arbitrary and unilateral decisions and actions increase the level of mistrust. Additionally, these actions demonstrate that dumping the burden on ones’ neighbors

⁵⁶ Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, pages 34-35 Source: https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

⁵⁷ Sven Bishop, 2016, The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics, Security Policy Brief No 75, page 4-5, Source <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/SPB75.pdf>

is the new trend among EU member states. The longstanding principles of solidarity and fair burden sharing are now in question. Right there is where the EU policies fail, the Union begins to tear and the structure starts to disintegrate.

6.3. Beyond Existing Policy: The Choice of Exiting the EU

The result of the UK referendum over the exit of the country from the EU came as a blow to the unity of an institution that in the past used to attract countries. Who can deny though that the British have always had a particular mindset and policy over the EU? Who can forget Margaret Thatcher, who kept asking for “her money back”, in a clear manifestation that the distance that separates the British Isles from the rest of the European continent is far greater than the 32 metric kilometers. However, it would be equally shortsighted to ignore the fact that the migration issue was one of the main arguments of those who supported the BREXIT vote.

The UK has always been a favorite destination for immigrants trying to find a better future. The already multicultural British society, presents a perfect destination for all, as the language requirements are easily attainable and the prosperous economy presents employment opportunities. On the other hand access to this “promised land” is not granted indiscriminately to all. Only the skilled and English language competent are to be accepted and that only through a well regulated procedure. The rest will have to become unregistered or stay in the “Calais Jungle” across the English Channel, hoping for a lucky strike. Nevertheless the issue raised by BREXIT supporters is more related to EU internal migration. It appears that the British feel more threatened by the unrestricted arrival of EU migrants than by the arrival of non – EU migrants which is after all strictly regulated. Although relative surveys show that the UK economy has benefited from the arrival of immigrants and especially those coming from the EU, the issue still sparked a controversy between the BREXIT supporters and those who opposed it. From the time however that the BREXIT was voted, the whole picture became obvious. Far from the various arguments against or for migration, economy, foreign policy, administration, etc, all the issues came down to just one: The UK has decided to leave the EU because of its reluctance to follow the rules set by the Union. From that point of view, the BREXIT choice is an honest one, bearing also the approval of the public.

Since the beginning of the Greek economic crisis and due to the country’s failure to conform to the standards set by the EU, Greece has been frequently threatened by a forced exit from the Eurozone. To make things worse, due to the nature of the Eurozone accession agreement, the only way for Greece to leave the Eurozone was to leave the EU altogether. Especially before the July 2015 Greek Referendum, on the issue of accepting or not the terms of the EU economic bail out of the country, it was repeatedly stressed by the EU Commission and also from the leaders of the strongest EU member countries, that the real issue on the table was not the bailout plan but the exit of the country from the Eurozone and the EU. This argument proved highly effective as, despite the fact that the Greek voters voted

against the plan, the Greek government succumbed to the EU pressure and signed a much worse bailout plan, in order to avoid a disastrous GREXIT.

Furthermore, in the course of this migration crisis, Greece has been frequently reprimanded for alleged failure to apply the rules of the Schengen Treaty. Although FRONTEX as the EU official executive body for the monitoring of the EU external border, concluded that there is no way that Greece could stop the incoming flows from Turkey without violating international law, the threat of a temporary suspension of the Greek participation in the Schengen Area was put on the table

The near GREXIT and the BREXIT examples, as well as the Schengen exclusion threat to Greece, clearly indicates that countries which choose not to follow the EU rules and legislations have but one option: to leave the Union.

In that sense, the decision of some EU member states to put the question of accepting or not refugees to a referendum, bear characteristics similar to the choices the Greece and the UK faced not so long ago. Once more, the respect of EU legislation, of the decisions and even of the EU Constitutional Treaty is challenged. We must not forget that:

failure by a Member State to abide values, like respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, may lead to the suspension of that Member State's rights deriving from membership of the Union.

(Constitutional Treaty Article I-59)⁵⁸

To that point the suggestion of the Jean Asselborn, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxemburg on the 13 September 2106, that Hungary could be expelled from the EU for treating migrants like animals,⁵⁹ could be a legitimate nevertheless extreme argument. Moreover, can one EU member state hold a referendum against EU rules, without simultaneously raising the issue of exiting the Union? The Hungarian referendum on migration held in October 2016, could have proven to be a challenge for the future of the Union. Fortunately the low turnout rendered the referendum void and saved both the Hungarian government and the EU from a difficult choice. If the Hungarian people had chosen overwhelmingly to vote against EU rules for migration, then the Union would either have to impose punitive measures against the member state, or admit that the EU member states decisions can overrule EU legislation and decisions. So far, the defiant decision of the British and the Greeks, as well as the controversial referendum in Hungary seem to confirm the hypothesis, that that there are substantial centrifuge forces of the EU.

In conclusion, it is evident that one of the major issues of controversy that surfaced with the migration crisis is the will of the EU member states to relinquish

⁵⁸ EU Commission, Culture, Policy Strategic Framework, 2016, *Intercultural Dialogue*, http://ec.europa.eu/culture/policy/strategic-framework/intercultural-dialogue_en.htm

⁵⁹ <https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article158094135/Asselborn-fordert-Ausschluss-Ungarns-aus-der-EU.html>

some of their sovereign rights to the European Union. In times of prosperity and security all EU member states portrayed as model members of an ideal Union. It is in situations of economic crisis and in times where a burden must be shared, that the centrifuge forces of the EU are stronger than ever. Are we members of a family only when it suits our purposes, or the promise that we stand united “for good or bad” is a void one. If this marriage of countries is not able to survive a crisis, then the road to a divorce is open. If this decision becomes an easy one to make, then the membership in the EU is not a strategic choice, but a simple contract which can be broken. This is the real question: is the EU a group of countries that one can come and go as he pleases, or is it about a tie, unbreakable enough to restrict members from going astray but also protect them in the face of crises?

6.4. EU Communication Strategy

6.4.1. A Message of Weakness both to EU Citizens and to Rivals

One of the risks that EU appears to be neglecting is the image that is projected to its own citizens. EU member states in the exposed southern and eastern periphery of the EU feel abandoned and cannot understand why they have to demonstrate their loyalty to the EU principle of solidarity by restricting the movement of migrants to the north, when their northern neighbors are reluctant to show any kind of similar solidarity towards them and share the real burden of hosting migrants. EU public, realizing that their governments are far from reaching an agreement over issues that will definitely have an impact on their lives, become coldhearted to any idea of more EU integration that is simply not working when it is most needed.

Moreover, although the EU is one of the major economic powers in the world, its reaction to the refugee crisis is discrediting to the eyes of competitors or uncomfortable allies. Vladimir Putin had no second thoughts before accusing the West for negligence: “*it's the West's wrongheaded foreign policy in the Middle East and Northern Africa that's at the root of the crisis*”⁶⁰. On the same line, the EU has allowed the mockery coming from one of the main perpetrators of this crisis. , Turkey’s President Erdogan told CNN: “*To be honest, the whole Western world is to be blamed in my opinion on this issue. Europe is turning the Mediterranean into a cemetery,*”⁶¹ while at the same time he allowed criminals to traffic people across the Aegean and pretended that he could do nothing to control his coastline. This though proved to be far from the truth when the flows were radically reduced following an agreement signed between the EU and Turkey.

Unable to adopt and follow a proactive policy, the EU was in reality dragged by the ruthless protectors of traffickers to an agreement, unacceptable by moral standards. The EU by accepting this deal has succumbed to blackmail, where the lives of innocent are used as a bargaining chip, and has agreed to pay a handsome “ransom” of 3 billion and re-examine the visa requirement for Turkish citizens traveling to EU member states. This was the tradeoff for a pause to the flows of

⁶⁰ Smith-Spark Laura, 2015, op.cit.

⁶¹ Smith-Spark Laura, 2015, op.cit.

migrants and a controversial plan for the return of those who arrive on the EU shores through illegal ways. Long planned accession policy was relinquished in favor of a controversial plan to avoid confrontation with a government that intentionally neglects to control the smugglers at the shores of Turkey and watches apathetically the drama unfold to its benefit. Critical trust⁶² to the EU is suffering while the Union is humiliated and the image of power that might have wanted to project, now stands in shamble.

It is obvious that when the EU proceeded with the Schengen Area project, the goal was to abolish internal frontiers, but failed to tackle the external frontier protection issue. Under the provisions of the Dublin II agreement, countries of first entry were left to cope with a wider EU problem, with very little help from an organization responsible for the external borders (FRONTEX), which unfortunately has little authority.

The sudden awakening in the face of massive waves of immigrants coming from the Turkish coast, has led to proposals for emergency measures that are touching sensitive issues, like the sovereignty of countries and unresolved territorial issues that the EU wanted to avoid dealing with for a long time. Although solutions to the pressing migrant issue are being urgently explored, the risk is that, in order to get Turkey finally to cooperate and combat human trafficking, there will be more concessions from the side of the EU.

6.4.2. A Wrong Message of Strategic Consequences

Not surprisingly, these concessions might be at the expense of Greece, who instead of having the EU on its' side on the issues of the Search and Rescue (SAR) responsibility and that of the Exclusive Economic Zone, will see the EU and the planned successor of FRONTEX de facto sharing these sovereign rights with Turkey. Greek officials have made a clear warning. The former Greek minister of foreign affairs Evangelos Venizelos stated that

The delineation of the Greek land, maritime and air borders and the zones of sovereign rights, as well as the areas in which the authority for issues of search and rescue is exercised by Greece must be accepted by the European mechanisms

(Evangelos Venizelos, 2016)⁶³

It has to be mentioned that the EU so far has never seen its territory as a global common good and therefore has never felt the need to protect it. If it did, then Turkey would have never been allowed to continue its EU accession process without first withdrawing its troops from the Northern part of the Republic of Cyprus. Furthermore, if all the EU member states (including Greece) and the EU as a whole

⁶² Ragnar Löfstedt, Åsa Boholm, 2009, op.cit, page 10

⁶³ Kathimerini, (3 January 2016) *Prosfygiko kai ethika themata*, Retrieved 3 January 2016 from <http://www.kathimerini.gr/844380/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/prosfygiko-kai-e8nika-8emata>

are signatories of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)⁶⁴ and use this convention as the main legal document for the resolution of all disputes, how can the EU refuse Greece to demand the adoption of this convention in its dispute with Turkey?

If Greek sovereign rights are sacrificed in a dubious effort to limit the number of refugees reaching the countries in the central and western parts of the EU, then Greeks could possibly see the EU as a liability. It is about sacrificing a member state legitimate common good for a controversial common good of other member states. After all migrants head for specific countries and do not head to Estonia, Rumania or Ireland. The failure to find common solutions has succeeded in turning an EU external problem, to an internal one, that directly threatens the unity the EU members.

Progressively the absence of a unified and equitable policy on the issue of migration, creates the perception that the issue of a well regulated migration constitutes a common good for some EU member states but not a global one for the EU as a whole. Given the circumstances, the common good of some EU member states is in conflict with the common good of other EU member states. EU member states not directly involved either try to stay out the way or seize the opportunity to improve their status, in a Union that members are not equal but are divided into sacred and sacrificial ones. This is probably not the kind of message Robert Schuman⁶⁵ had on his mind when he set the foundation principles of the EU.

Additionally, if the EU, seeking a win-win solution with the Turks, is willing to sacrifice the global good of one of its members, how much of a regional power image is projected internally and externally? And even worse: what is the image of unity and decisiveness that the Union is projecting when, in an attempt to avoid displeasing Turkey, is ready to sacrifice the membership of Greece in the Schengen Area and use it as the scapegoat for issues that go well beyond Greece's control? Unfortunately the image projected is discrediting for the EU.

6.4.3. Overall Evaluation of the EU Communication Strategy

In conclusion, the message emitted by both the EU Commission and the EU member states is a wrong one. The EU seems divided in the face of difficulties and the impression that this Union is only working in times of prosperity and tranquility, is disappointing for the EU citizens. It is even more disappointing for the

⁶⁴ In the TURKEY 2013 PROGRESS REPORT of the EU Commission, in page 34 it is mentioned: "As the EU implements United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provisions inter alia in the Common Fisheries Policy, ratification of UNCLOS by Turkey would improve cooperation with the EU in the area of fisheries and maritime policy". The language used however does not make this ratification obligatory. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013SC0417&from=en>

⁶⁵ Jean-Baptiste Nicolas Robert Schuman; 29 June 1886 – 4 September 1963). Prime Minister of France for two terms. He was instrumental in building post-war European and trans-Atlantic institutions and is regarded as one of the founders of the European Union, the Council of Europe and NATO.

citizens of the EU member states that feel that their interests and worries are less important than others. This lack of unity and determination leaves the EU exposed to the manipulation efforts of rivals, such as Turkey. It is not surprising that Turkey demands of the EU to act in defiance of the set of internal and international legislation adopted and is using the crisis as a lever of pressure in order to obtain short term but also long term gains.

What is both surprising and disappointing, is that the EU has chosen to succumb to this pressure and sacrifice its proper, but also Greek common goods in an attempt to avoid confrontation with Turkey. This is clearly a message which the EU should avoid sending out, especially in times where challenges are increasing constantly and almost in every domain.

7. NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS

7.1. Benefits in the Economy

Acknowledging the risks coming from the refugee crisis does not mean that we should limit ourselves to them. Successful crisis management requires making the best out of any positive aspects. Perhaps the EU public is overlooking some of the positive things that go together with migration.

The interest on the positive issues from migration transcends the European continent and has been a topic of extensive research throughout the world. The issue was also included in the agenda of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD's position is that, in order for societies to form an accurate picture of the phenomenon and proceed in a creative debate, it is fundamental to understand the impact of migration. It will be the results of such debates that will allow the design of a coherent overall policy, that will encompass education and employment which in turn will maximize the benefits of migration, especially by improving migrants' employment situation. As the various regions of the world face different conditions and circumstances, the policy envisaged by the OECD must be adjusted to the specificities of each country. As demographic realities in most of the OECD developed countries and their resulting shortfalls in the workforce become difficult to ignore, the question that should attract our interest should be: "how to maximize the benefits of migration, both for host countries and the migrants themselves?"

7.1.1. Focusing on the EU Case

7.1.1.1. EU Long Term Challenges

In the EU Global Strategy it is mentioned The EU population is accustomed to the comforts that were the fruit of a continuous growth for nearly 6 decades. Nevertheless the EU demographics which have been in decline for a long period will eventually jeopardize the future prosperity of EU citizens. Additionally, the economic crisis has revealed that in the new globalized market, there are other more dynamic and resilient players to share the pie of global wealth. China, India and

Brazil, having young and dynamic populations, challenge directly the advantages that the US, Japan and the EU have enjoyed so far almost exclusively. Aging workforce could prove to be a critical vulnerability for the EU in contrast to the young and ever growing workforce of the new challengers. Being impossible to convince the EU indigenous population to trade their wealth and comfort for more children, the only possible way to renew the workforce of the EU is through migration. It is of no wonder that Germany, being the power engine of the EU's economy, is willing to welcome refugees.

The size of the labor force in the countries of western and central EU is 227 million. In the absence of immigration and at the current labor force reduction rates this force would shrink to 201 million in 2025 and to 160 million in 2050. In order to maintain its constant over the analyzed period, a net inflow of 66 million labor migrants would be necessary. This would mean that on average a net inflow of slightly less than 1.5 million labor migrants per year would be required to keep the EU's economically active population at constant levels. However, since not all newcomers will join the work force (e.g. children and elder) the total net migration would have to be higher⁶⁶.

OECD being an organization focused on the economy, the issue of perceptions of the economic impact of migration weighs heavily on its debates. In order to examine the problem and come up with a concrete conclusion on the benefits or burdens from migration, has divided the subject into three areas, the labor market, the public purse and economic growth⁶⁷.

Although the figures available date back to 2014, the trend suggests that 70% of the increase in the labor market of the EU during a decade is attributed to migrants. It was also proven that migrants fill important niches, both in fast-growing and declining sectors of the economy. On top of that, the new arrivals, being young, are better educated than the previous generation nearing exit from the labor market. Important is also the fact that the arrival of the migrants contributes significantly to the labor-market flexibility.

The public purse also benefits from the arrival of migrants. It is acknowledged that migrants contribute more in taxes and social contributions than they receive in benefits. In that sense labor migrants have the most positive impact on the public purse.

Economic growth is also stimulated by migration, since it boosts the working age population. Migrants also arrive with skills and contribute to human capital development of the receiving countries. Finally migrants contribute to technological progress⁶⁸. All that leads to the conclusion that successful integration of migrants can result in benefits for the economy.

⁶⁶ Münz Rainer, (April 2008), op.cit, page 9

⁶⁷ OECD, Migration Policy Debates (May 2014), *Is migration good for the economy?* page 1

⁶⁸ OECD, Migration Policy Debates (May 2014), *Is migration good for the economy?* page 4

7.1.1.2. The Case Study of the United Kingdom

While adopting the findings and recommendations of the OECD, it is important to remember that the envisioned benefits of migration come only when this migration is done under specific rules and conditions which maximize the positive issues and minimize the negative ones. The EU must come up with policies tailored to the specific EU needs. The UK example is indicative of the kind of rules that must be followed in order for migration to have a positive impact. Immigrants received by the UK can be distinguished in two major categories: to those coming from the EU whose entry is unrestricted and to those that come from countries other than the EU ones, and whose acceptance is based on a point system that guarantees that the immigrants are fit for working in the country.

A survey conducted by the London School of Economics/Centre for Economic Performance, showed that EU immigrants to the UK are more educated, younger, more likely to be employed and less likely to claim benefits than the UK-born. Additionally and although many people were concerned that immigration would reduce the pay and job chances of the UK born due to more competition for jobs, it proved that since immigrants consume goods and services there was an increase of the demand that helped to create more employment opportunities. Moreover, immigrants might also have skills that complement UK-born workers.

Evidence suggests that the areas of the UK with large increases in EU immigration did not suffer great falls in the jobs and pay of UK-born workers. Any fall in wages after 2008 was a result of the financial crisis, not of immigration. Even for the less educated workers, there is little correlation of the changes in wages and joblessness with changes in EU immigration. Also on the positive side is the finding that immigrants pay more in taxes than they take out in welfare and the use of public services. Therefore, they help reduce the budget deficit. As for their impact on the local services such as crime, education, health, or social housing, it was also found that there was no negative effect.⁶⁹

Learning from the UK experience it becomes clear that even in the case of an uncontrollable migration, like the one coming from other EU member states the economic effects are not negative or at least not only negative. Quite on the contrary, there are clear indications of substantial economic benefits of migration. Additionally, immigrants that come from countries other than the EU ones, follow a well regulated process that guarantees their integration in the labor force. This is exactly the reason why the main argument during the BREXIT debate was over the unrestricted EU migration and not over the non EU immigrants, whose integration in the labor force does not seem to create concerns for the UK public.

⁶⁹ Wadsworth Jonathan, Dhingra Swati, Ottaviano Gianmarco and Van Reenen John (2016), *Brexit and the Impact of Immigration on the UK*, Abstract

The arguments are too important to be overlooked. In fact the EU as an institution and the individual EU member states could capitalize on these findings, or on findings of similar surveys and launch public communication campaigns. It is through these communication campaigns that will help the public realize that, the potential risk that they take now will in turn help in limiting the serious economic risk that next generations will have to face. This awareness could positively influence peoples' minds and turn the tide in the right direction.

Economically, the goal is to allow the legal entry of migrants in the workforce, thus allow them to become active members of the economy of the host country. A system must be set in place and the sooner migrants become economically active and fiscally accountable, the sooner they will start contributing to the economy and will gain the acceptance of the local population. Of course and in order for this plan to succeed first it has to be implemented correctly and fully and second, to have the cooperation of the migrants themselves. It is important to stress the fact that the UK, which has seen the benefits of migration, neither has nor intends to adopt, an "open door" policy for migrants.

7.1.1.3. Spinning the Wheel of Economy

Apart from the direct benefits of migrants taxes and flexible labor, there are also significant collateral economic benefits. The case of Greece is indicative of what these can be. In a time when the economic depression and unemployment have reached record levels, the arrival of migrants has sparked a surge of economic activity, both in the places of first arrival and in the places where they are hosted. The so far stagnant local economies saw a rise in immediate revenues for businesses like catering, hygiene, transportation and construction. Indirect revenues also increased for all enterprises that support the first line providers and especially International Organizations, NGOs and relief workers.

In places like Polykastro, which is right in the centre of a region which hosts the majority of the refugee relocation centers, daily life has changed: apart from the refugees themselves, the high number of relief agency workers has created opportunities for the local community. Reserving a hotel in the area is hard and restaurants, local coffee shops are bustling with life. The arrival of a high number of foreigners has created a new momentum. Shop owners are trying to adjust their businesses to the demands of the newly arrived. Regardless of the source, it is evident that there is a new flow of money in the area. However, nobody knows for how long this flow will continue or if this funding will reduce as interest for refugees will decline.

At a second glance though, a careful eye can spot another refugee-triggered change that goes deeper into the mindset of the locals. The people of this small Greek countryside city, usually feeling at the margins of the country's economic life, now realize that in this changing world, one must be open to opportunities and be prepared, at least at the linguistic level. They enjoy a rare chance

for interaction with people from all the corners of the world, which turns them into a sort of cosmopolitans, having their own habits, but understanding and easily tolerating other peoples' customs.

Perhaps this is the added value of this crisis. Living in a world globalized in trade, information, communication and now movement, acquiring this cosmopolitan culture is an asset. Societies must be open to contact and understanding other cultures, without forgetting their own customs and roots. Bearing in mind that globalization opens not only the way to opportunities, but also the way to competition, this cultural awareness may be the ticket to success.

7.2. Institutional Reforms at EU Level

The arguments mentioned above clearly illustrate the economic and cultural benefits EU societies could possibly enjoy from migration. The EU though, as an institution should look for more. In fact, if the EU manages to deal with this crisis effectively and succeeds in pulling together its member states towards a closer union, based not just on common values but on evenly balanced gains and burdens, then the migration crisis might turn into a political and economical success story for the EU.

One clear example of gains to be made, is the opportunity that is presented to the EU in the context of the protection of the EU external borders. If the EU decides to move forward and built a mechanism for the active and global protection of the EU external borders, this could constitute a positive step in building a more efficient Europeans Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and a step further, a true foreign policy. A tangible step would be the establishment of a new EU coastguard. Using this EU coastguard to safeguard both the EU general interest and also the legal rights of the EU members, as defined in the EU adopted international conventions, would send a crystal clear message to both internal and external audiences.

This crisis could also act as a catalyst for closer unification of the EU member states. It is understandable that the EU is a Union of nations which retain their traditions, languages, religions. However, further integration requires concessions and even limiting some of the sovereign rights of the member states. One cannot be part of a Union by deciding unilaterally. The economic crisis has been the catalyst for closer fiscal rules and important changes in the structure of the EU economy. Regrettably, some of the changes were hard for those who had to forcibly adopt them, but without the crisis this new structure would be very difficult to introduce. Many might argue that the decisions taken were dictated by the strongest countries that wanted to protect their interests and not a product of consultation. This is one of the things that the EU should avoid in the future, if it wants to be respected and valued by all its members.

Nevertheless, it was the crisis itself that set the wheels in motion and therefore it could constitute an opportunity for closer cooperation. This leads to the conclusion that this crisis will spark institutional changes in the EU. Although for the time being, most prefer to stick to their own country-first policy, the predicted

duration of the migration crisis will eventually forge a closer union or lead to disintegration. The issue of migration is simply too big to handle with the old practices and mindsets.

7.3. Important Benefits under Certain Conditions

In conclusion, apart from the negative impact of this migration crisis, there is also a positive one in the domain of the economy, that could help turn this difficult situation into a success story for the EU. Although currently the EU member states enjoy a high standard of living, their future economic prosperity is challenged by the shrinking labor force due to the declining demographic trend. There is no way of compensating the reducing labor force, other than migration. To that point the current migration crisis could prove to be an opportunity. There is enough experience on the issue of integrating immigrants in the labor force of the host nations. Evidence suggests that the arrival of immigrants has a positive impact on the economy of the host country, in domains like the labor market, the public purse and economic growth.

Experience also indicates that for this effort to succeed, this migration needs to be well regulated, in order make sure that the migrants are able to join the labor force. On the other hand the EU member states public must become aware that the declining demographic trend will inevitably have a negative impact and that they must perceive the current migration flow, less as a problem and more as a solution to some of their long term economic problems.

At the institutional level, this migration crisis has brought to the forefront all issues that were not carefully studied and resolved in calmer times. Issues like the protection of the EU external border, the way legitimate claims of individual EU member states are to be supported in any dispute with third parties, as well as the EU decision process, became points of controversy. Properly exploited, this crisis could result in improving the fundamental decision making process of the EU, the cohesion of the EU members and last but not least, in making the EU voice and posture stronger. Resolving internal disputes and bringing together diverging trends is a prerequisite for success. Although this process might not be an easy one, it is imperative that the EU succeeds in that. The challenges ahead are too great to ignore.

8. INTEGRATION

Integration is *the process by which immigrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups. The particular requirements for acceptance by a receiving society vary greatly from country to country; and the responsibility for integration rests not with one particular group, but rather with many actors: immigrants themselves, the host government, institutions, and communities*⁷⁰

IOM/International Migration Law

⁷⁰ http://www.iomvienna.at/sites/default/files/IML_1_EN.pdf, page 32

8.1. Lessons from Former Integration Efforts

8.1.1. Numbers of Former Migrants In the EU Countries

A World Bank survey in 2008 showed that, 42 million people residing in the 27 countries of the EU and in 4 associated countries (other EEA, CH)⁷¹ were regular international and intra-EU migrants. They represented 8.3 percent of the total population of the countries of western and central EU. Some 14 million of these migrants had come from other EU member states (in some cases prior to the EU accession of their home countries). The remaining 28 million had come from other parts of the European continent and other world regions. Among them some 19 million were immigrants from Asia, the Middle East and North-Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. On average these migrants from third countries and their children had lower skills and lower labor force participation rates than native EU citizens⁷².

Moreover, skilled immigrants are not evenly distributed between the EU Member States. In the same survey, it was clearly illustrated that some countries were more successful in attracting high skilled labor; for example Ireland (59.0 percent), Denmark (37.8 percent) and Estonia (37.0 percent). In the same time other countries were destinations of mainly low skilled migrants: Portugal (50.5 percent), Malta (50.4 percent), Belgium (48.3 percent), France (47.6 percent), Austria (45.6 percent), Greece (44.4 percent) and Spain (43.9 percent)⁷³. This fact is by itself alarming. As explained earlier some of the advantages from immigration, like the availability of new competences, the boosting of technology and other advantages are only possible when the host countries attract high skilled labor.

It becomes evident that the issue of the distribution of highly skilled migrants, will be just another issue dividing the southern and northern countries of the EU. As the southern countries of the EU fail to attract the highly skilled, automatically the benefits that they could enjoy become much less. Moreover, the South is also suffering from the loss of its own highly skilled labor which, due to the economic crisis, is moving to the North. Eventually the countries of the South, depleted of their own and also of any possible migrant skilled labor, will gradually become a labor market for the low skilled. At that stage, the reputed business friendly advantage of labor flexibility can turn into a nightmare for the unemployed and also for the badly paid labor force – native EU or migrant alike.

The argument that immigrants will create economic growth and significantly boost EU member states economy has yet to be proven for its validity for

⁷¹ EEA - European Economic Area (those countries who don't have EU membership but have many of the same benefits - namely Norway and Switzerland) CH - Switzerland

⁷² Münz Rainer, 2008, op.cit, page 11

⁷³ Münz Rainer, 2008, op.cit, page 9

all member countries and may not be enough to mitigate the impact of the failed assimilation process. To that point it is clear that not all EU member states economies can benefit from migration.

8.1.2. The Case Study of Sweden

For many years the countries of the EU and in particular the western and northern ones had hoped for a successful integration of immigrants, with the hope of attaining assimilation in the second and third generation of immigrants. The feedback from the integration process followed in the past however has not been encouraging. Sweden is a case study worth focusing on. Sweden has adopted some of the most generous immigration policies, which are essential to the image of a country that (like Canada) prides itself as a moral superpower. In fact Sweden takes in more refugees per capita than any other EU country. Immigrants – mainly from the Middle East and Africa – now make up about 16 per cent of the population, while questioning the political consensus over the issue of immigration is regarded as xenophobic and hateful.

Unfortunately however, as Tino Sanandaji, a Kurdish-Swedish economist and specialist on immigration issues observes, there has been a lack of integration among non-European refugees. Forty-eight percent of immigrants of working age are unemployed. Even after 15 years in Sweden, their employment rates reach only about 60 percent. Sweden has the biggest employment gap in the EU between natives and non-natives. Forty-two percent of the long-term unemployed are immigrants while fifty-eight percent of welfare payments go to immigrants. Forty-five percent of children with low test scores are immigrants. Immigrants on average earn less than 40 percent than Swedes do. The majority of people charged with murder, rape and robbery are either first- or second-generation immigrants. And that is not the fault of the Swedish state or of the immigrants. Sweden's labor market is highly skills-intensive, and even low-skilled Swedes can't get work. So what chance is there for a 405-year-old woman from Central Africa?⁷⁴

Sweden's misconception, also found in other countries as well, is that if one socializes the children of immigrants and refugees correctly, they'll grow up to be just like native Swedes. Evidence however suggests that this proved to be false. Much of the second generation immigrants still live in Swedish welfare ghettos. The social strains and the general decline in trust are growing worse. Yet the mainstream media, loyal to the culture of stopping racism, fails to report bad news. Due to this self-censorship, the gap between the opinion elites and the voters on immigration issues is now a chasm. The perceptions of risk from immigration are diverging and although the issue is intentionally ignored, realities and statistics eventually surface.

⁷⁴Wente Margaret, (11 September 2015), *Sweden's Ugly Immigration problem*, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/swedens-ugly-immigration-problem/article26338254/>

According to a recent opinion poll, 58 per cent of Swedes believe there is too much immigration.⁷⁵

Sweden is a great case study for anyone who believes that the EU is capable of assimilating the hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants who have arrived in the EU member states in just over a year or the millions more who are desperately poised to follow the same path.

8.1.3. A Comparison with the US Integration Process

At this point it would be interesting to see how things are evolving in the United States. Contrary to the EU, the Muslims in the US have a better level of integration in the US society. With the exception of a few jihadist attacks, in general the Muslims in the US does not distinguish themselves according to their religion, nor to their origin. A closer look reveals that all migrants, first, second or third generation and regardless of their religion, have to live with hard but simple rules: “get a job or get out”. The US population and migrants, contrary to the EU, cannot rely on a generous welfare policy and has to have a job. Getting a job however in the US means that, the worker must get along with others and be a part of the team. There is no room for anything that would jeopardize employment. Of course, there are cases where underprivileged people, like uneducated African Americans, live in bad conditions and face social exclusion. This however is rather due to the bad economic situation and not to their ethnic origin or their confession.

“So far U.S. immigrant integration has occurred essentially without policy intervention and relatively little federal funding, relying instead primarily on a strong labor market and high-quality public education”

(Tomás R. Jiménez, 2011)⁷⁶

It is usual that second generation migrants do better than their parents in terms of educational achievements, employment status, wealth, and home ownership. There is a significant decrease of residential segregation between the two generations, while those who marry people from other ethnic and racial groups are much more among the second generation. Finally, the language proficiency of the second generation dramatically improved in comparison to their parents. Perhaps, it is the social welfare system of the EU member states that enable migrants to survive long term unemployment, allows social self exclusion and leads integration efforts to failure.

In a 2012 poll, 80-95% of immigrants surveyed from 15 EU cities said they were long term residents in the EU or they intended to become one. They greatly value opportunities to learn the native language and the vast majority is

⁷⁵ Wente Margaret, 2015, op.cit.

⁷⁶ Tomás R. Jiménez, Migration Policy Institute, 2011, *Immigrants in the United States: How Well Are They Integrating into Society?* Source: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigrants-united-states-how-well-are-they-integrating-society>

interested in civic and political participation. These figures⁷⁷ easily present an idealized picture of migrant integration in the EU. The fact remains that not everything is perfect and segregation and social exclusion of migrant communities can be a serious problem. In France, for example, there are 717 ‘sensitive urban zones’, mostly in the suburbs of large cities (known as ‘banlieuses’). These neighborhoods have twice the national rate of unemployment, over 35% of the inhabitants are below the national poverty line, and over 50% are of foreign origin. EUROSTAT confirms that, long term unemployment as a percentage of total unemployment, has increased for the non-EU-born population from 28.4 % in 2009 to 51.2 % in 2015, after a decrease from 2008 to 2009⁷⁸. It seems that the integration followed so far is somewhat failing.

Ten years ago, in 2005, tensions boiled over into a series of riots in the banlieuses of Paris and other French cities⁷⁹. There are those who, at a theoretical level, argue that immigrants who make it to the EU must adopt customs and the culture of the country they arrived in. In other words, they consider that the way to deal with diversity is by simply denying its existence and by just considering everyone as a ‘citizen’ just as any other. On the other hand EU institutions came up with a way to theoretically approach better the issues of diversity and assimilation. It is based on the notion of interculturalism, which the Council of Europe has developed over the last decade and where the emphasis is on managing diversity in a way that recognizes it as a two-way street.⁸⁰

Intercultural dialogue is, essentially, the exchange of views and opinions between different cultures. Unlike multiculturalism, where the focus is on the preservation of separate cultures, intercultural dialogue seeks to establish linkages and common ground between different cultures, communities, and people, promoting understanding and interaction

EU Commission, 2016⁸¹

Nevertheless, as it was mentioned, this is a two way street and both sides need to be interested in such and exchange, without prejudice and without radicalized views over nationality, culture or more importantly, religion. Theories though are evaluated for their validity by their successful application and the intercultural dialogue has yet to prove its validity.

8.1.4. EU Aspirations for Successful Migrant Integration

⁷⁷ Debating Europe, 2015, *How can Europe better integrate immigrants?* Source <http://www.debatingeurope.eu/2015/07/02/how-can-europe-better-integrate-immigrants/#.V9mIok2LTIU>

⁷⁸ Eurostat, Statistics explained, 2016, *Unemployment Statistics, A detailed look at 2015*, Source http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics

⁷⁹ Debating Europe, 2015, op.cit.

⁸⁰ Debating Europe, 2015, op.cit.

⁸¹ EU Commission, Culture, Policy Strategic Framework, 2016, *Intercultural Dialogue*, http://ec.europa.eu/culture/policy/strategic-framework/intercultural-dialogue_en.htm

Currently, some 14 million third country immigrants are living in the countries of the EU. For this labor force to be beneficial for the host countries, there must be a balance between skilled and non skilled immigrants. The fact that the poorer southern countries cannot compete in the race for attracting the most skilled migrants, explains why any benefits of migration will not be seen in their economies. This is even more understandable when one takes into consideration that, these countries are increasingly losing their own skilled labor force which is also migrating to the northern countries. Gradually unskilled labor becomes disproportionately concentrated in poorer countries, with a detrimental effect on the assimilation process. The linkage of the success of the assimilation process with the level of the skills of the migrants has been clearly displayed in the cases of the French suburbs.

The US experience of integration also demonstrates that success is directly linked to employment. Unfortunately, even in some of the northern countries with a long tradition of welcoming refugees and migrants, like Sweden, the assimilation has not been as effective as it was hoped. Despite the fact that the failure of the assimilation process is still a taboo issue in Sweden, the truth is evident in the welfare ghettos, in the unemployment rates among third country migrants and in the statistics concerning migrant delinquency. Here also lies a handicap in the communication strategy of the government. Denying a problem is not the solution. Even Swedes, silently acknowledging the situation gradually become more skeptical over immigration.

Based on the responses routinely given by migrants, the impression is that almost everyone wants to integrate in the society of the host country. A follow up survey however reveals that, the integration process is not as effective as envisaged and segregation and social exclusion of migrant communities is a serious problem. These migrant communities become hubs for unemployment that leads in turn to higher delinquency rates and radicalization.

Obviously the policy adopted so far needs to be improved. The EU has high hopes that the new way to success will pass through an intercultural dialogue, which seeks to find common ground between different cultures, communities, and people, thus bringing them closer. This EU plan however is based on the harmonic coexistence of the migrant communities with the local societies and has yet to prove that it is effective.

8.2. Is the EU the Emerging Ground for “The Clash of Civilizations”?

Apart from the impact of migration on EU member states’ economies, there is also another aspect that needs to be seriously considered. The issue of culture and civilization. The values of the EU are described in the Constitutional Treaty of the Union. The preamble of the Treaty cites, among other things,

Europe's cultural, religious and humanist inheritance”, and invokes “the desire of the peoples of Europe to transcend their ancient divisions in order to forge a common destiny, while remaining proud of their national identities and history

The Treaty also stipulates that the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. Moreover, the societies of the Member States are characterized by pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men. This is the essence of Western civilization as seen from the EU perspective.

8.2.1. The “Clash of Civilizations” Theory

In theory, at least according to the Harvard University professor S.P. Huntington⁸³, civilization is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. Civilizations are meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. Some argue that this difference in views is what makes diversity and that diversity doesn't have to lead to conflict. It is quite true that differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence.

Nevertheless, in the course of history, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts⁸⁴. Interestingly enough, the EUROPOL Terrorism Situation and Trends Report 2016, notes that religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism in on the increase in the EU member states, that could be interpreted as a violent expression of this clash of civilizations.

Migration is making our world a smaller place. Professor Huntington claims that the increased interaction of civilizations caused by migration, intensifies civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities among others. As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. In our globalized world, where immigrants are ready to break away from their country of origin in search for a better future, the self definition of migrant based on his nationality might not be the

⁸² http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

⁸³ Samuel Phillips Huntington (1927 – 2008) was an American political scientist, adviser and academic. He was the director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs and during the Carter administration, Huntington was the White House Coordinator of Security Planning for the National Security Council. He is most well known by his 1993 theory, "The Clash of Civilizations", of a post-Cold War new world order. He argued that future wars would be fought not between countries, but between cultures, and that Islamic extremism would become the biggest threat to Western world domination. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_P._Huntington

⁸⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, Foreign Affairs, 1993, *The Clash of Civilizations?*, page 25

self definition of first choice. After all, for the citizens of the host country he is primarily labeled as an “immigrant” and not by his nationality.

This fact weakens the notion of the country of origin as a source of identity. It is religion that increasingly steps in to fill this identity gap. For example, one person can be half Turkish and half German but he cannot be half Catholic and half Muslim. Additionally migrants do not feel constrained to live in one country and can choose to move, for example from France to the UK, if the circumstances demand it. Consequently the notion of citizenship is more appreciated as a tool for negotiating ones working conditions and less appreciated as a characteristic defining him. In a world where places and nations become irrelevant, religion can be the single point of reference.

However, this argument is precise when arriving migrants come individually and are free to move around. The situation is different when migrants find themselves together with other nationalities or religions in relatively confined areas. In the cases of the relocation centers in Greece, where various groups of migrants are mixed in the same camp, there have been many problems. Unfortunately, it was observed that these migrants maintain old rivalries and hatred with other ethnic or religious groups, which happened to be found in the same camp. Although Professor Huntington’s theory did not examine the clash of civilizations among Shia and Sunni Muslims, Muslim Kurds or Yazidis, Pakistanis and Afghans, it seems that this clash has been transferred to European soil.

It would be naïve to believe that people who have experienced extreme violence and persecution from other ethnic or religious groups will simply forgive and forget, just because they all ended up together in the EU. The intensity of this clash however is lowered when individuals find themselves out of their group. This fact though, is enough to confirm, at least to a point that apart from the clash of civilizations, there is also a clash of the various sects of each civilization.

8.2.2. Evidence of a “Clash of Civilizations” Between Migrants and EU Citizens

On the other hand the EU is based on Western civilization values. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for the EU made a specific reference to EU's cultural, religious and humanist inheritance. However, the basic perception that non-westerners have about the West is less idyllic. In their eyes the West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values. One could argue that there is a significant element of truth in their view. On top of that, relations with the Muslim countries are complicated: In the Arab world, the attempt to introduce Western type democracy resulted in strengthening anti-Western political forces. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little

resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu or Buddhist cultures.⁸⁵ This is bound to create a clash of civilizations in the EU between westerners and Muslims as the majority of the migrants arriving in the EU believe in Islam.

According to the Professor Ekaterina Stepanova of the European University in St. Petersburg, while the radicalization of the Muslims living in EU member states constitutes a growing challenge to EU societies, it is not likely that its main form of expression will be through terrorism. The jihadist attacks committed in the EU in 2015 were just 687 in a population of 20,6 millions of Muslims living in the EU member states⁸⁶. Radicalization of EU's ethnically and dogmatically diverse migrants, especially of the younger second or even third generation, is more likely to manifest itself through other, less deadly but more widespread and mass-based, forms of protest and violence. These range from delinquency, vandalism, and hate crimes, to the further consolidation of "grey" suburbs outside police control, public disorder, and revolts. The autumn 2005 urban unrest in France's banlieues (which did not involve Islamists) and the frequently violent street protests against Danish cartoons and Dutch films perceived as offending to Islam, may provide a more accurate indication of the kind of violent threats EU faces from the radicalization of Muslim migrants.

These threats are very different from the high-profile Islamist terrorist attacks in Madrid, London or Paris⁸⁷. This assumption is verified by the results of a 2011 PEW Institute survey, which found that relations between Muslims and Westerners are perceived to be bad in very few western counties of the EU, such as France 62% and Germany 61%. At the same time the perception of bad relations between Muslim and westerners is aspired by almost half of the whole population of the US (48%). The same research indicated also a disproportionately high level of mistrust of the Muslims living in the West towards westerners.⁸⁸ Although these bad relations and mistrust are not expressed with terrorist actions, what becomes evident is an undercurrent clash of civilizations.

Even worse, a shocking 2016 poll survey conducted by ICM Research for a UK Channel 4 documentary, with the title "What British Muslims Really Think," found that more than 100,000 British Muslims sympathize with suicide bombers and people who commit other terrorist acts. Moreover, only one in three British Muslims (34%) would contact the police if they believed that somebody

⁸⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, 1993, op.cit, page 25

⁸⁶EUROPOL, 2016, *Terrorism Situation and Trends Report 2016*, page 10 Source: <https://www.EUROPOL.europa.eu>

⁸⁷ Stepanova Ekaterina, 2008, *Radicalization of Muslim Immigrants in Europe and Russia, Beyond Terrorism: 2* https://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/pepm_029.pdf

⁸⁸ Lipka Michael, 2016, *Muslims and Islam key findings in the US and around the world*, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/22/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/>

close to them had become involved with jihadists⁸⁹. All these were verified during the manhunt for the Paris attackers in the suburbs of Brussels.

Although the theory of Professor Huntington has been a point of controversy among scholars, it would be prudent to examine if his theory is verified in the case of the EU Muslims. The fact that Muslims in the EU member states will prefer to be defined according to their religion and not according to their nationality becomes evident by the concentration of Muslims and not of national groups in specific areas. In their vast majority, they define themselves as Muslims, not as Algerians, Moroccans, Syrian or Turks. Furthermore, the existence of a clash of civilizations between Muslims and westerners is verified by the findings of the 2011 survey by the PEW Institute⁹⁰.

Of course not all Muslim resort to terrorist actions, but their majority has a bad perception and relation with EU citizens of western origin. Unfortunately the recent terrorist attacks in Western Europe, indicate the existence of an existing undercurrent radicalization of a part of the Muslim community living in the EU member states. The findings of the 2016 ICM Research in the UK, further demonstrate the level of radicalization among the Muslim communities. Regrettably, bearing in mind that only a third of that population would cooperate with the authorities combating Islamic terrorists, one cannot help but being tempted to accept that “not all Muslims are terrorists, but most terrorists are Muslims”^{91,92}. Bearing in mind that these acts of terrorism or the support of terrorism is in essence a form of communication, it becomes evident that instead of improving, the EU envisaged intercultural communication between the EU Muslim community and western societies is deteriorating.

8.3. Demographic Realities and Population Changes

While EU member states are still struggling to get over the economic crisis, there are some important developments which take place in a possibly more important domain, since they will have an impact on the mid and long term composition of the population. These developments will lead to the demographic collapse of the EU member states’ indigenous population and the massive arrival of large population of migrants, which under these conditions, will intensify in the coming decades.

8.3.1. The Case Study of Greece

⁸⁹ Kern Soeren, (17 April 2016), *UK: What British Muslims really think*, Retrieved from <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7861/british-muslims-survey>

⁹⁰ Lipka Michael, 2016, op.cit.

⁹¹ It would be interesting to observe that even Ilich Ramirez Sanchez (1949 -), also known as “Carlos The Jackal” has converted to Islam and has openly stated that Islam will replace communism as the main motive of terrorism, Source: <https://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/111891/carlos-jackal-carlos-jihadi-mark-tapson>

⁹² The recent years there has been a major decline in the number of political motivated terrorist attacks in the EU and the US. According to the Europol terrorism situation and trend report 2016, the largest proportion of arrests in the EU was linked to jihadist terrorism (687), as it was in the two preceding years (2014: 395 and 2013: 216). Arrests for both separatist (168) and left-wing terrorism (67) rose compared to 2014 (154 and 54 respectively).

Taking the example of Greece as a case study will help in examining the reasons for the demographic collapse of most of the EU member states. Greece is a good example to be used, as it is facing one of the most serious demographic problems in the EU, with the exception of Portugal. Compared to Greece, Cyprus, Poland, Spain and Italy are in a slightly better position but still face similar risks. From all the countries of the EU, France alone has a, marginal satisfactory, children per woman ratio of 2.1⁹³ (appendix 6).

The demographic collapse of the indigenous Greek population started silently in the 80s, when the yearly births reduced from 160 thousand to just 100 thousand and the fertility of Greek women has fallen below the renewal limit of 2.1 children per woman to just 1,3-1.4. For over 25 years the average Greek woman gave birth to less than the 2 children required for her to be replaced by a daughter, who will continue the renewal of generations. Consequently, every generation is smaller than the previous one. This constitutes the low fertility trap, that imposes a self-sustaining decline in most EU populations⁹⁴.

Why is the impact of this problem becoming more visible now? So far, the migratory flows that took place in the 90s, as well as the high birth rate of migrants (17% of the overall births), created the false impression that there was no demographic problem. Although the total of the population of Greece appeared to be stable between the years 2001 to 2010, the Greek indigenous population had already started to shrink while at the same time it continued to age. In 2015 the average age of the Greek population was 44 years⁹⁵.

After the start of the 2010 economic crisis the situation was aggravated in two ways: on the one hand the fertility rate has dropped lower and on the other hand, a part of the young population has migrated abroad, taking with them the portion of the births that correspond to them. In other words, Greece is looking at the catastrophic combination of a negative balance of births to deaths per year and of a negative migration balance of the indigenous population. That phenomenon was already experienced in Bulgaria in the years after the 90s, when its population was reduced from 9 to 7 million in a period of just 25 years, and keeps on shrinking with one of the fastest rates in the world⁹⁶. The case of Bulgaria is indicative of what lies ahead for Greece, but also for some of the EU member states. According to EUROSTAT demographic projections, the total population of Greece will not exceed 9 million people by the middle of this century. Naturally the population will keep shrinking if the fertility rate remains the same. What is even more shocking though is the fact that 3 out of the 9 million of people living in Greece in 2050, will be over

⁹³ Lavrentzos Anastasios, (2016), "*Greece: a country going through a mutation of population*", <http://www.capital.gr/me-apopsi/3160640/ellada-mia-xora-se-poreia-plithusmiakis-metallaxis>

⁹⁴ Lavrentzos Anastasios, 2016, op.cit.

⁹⁵ Lavrentzos Anastasios, (2016), op.cit

⁹⁶ Lavrentzos Anastasios, (2016), op.cit

the age of 65. In just one generation the Greek population will be facing an imminent collapse⁹⁷.

At the same time and due to its geographical location, Greece receives a very big migration flow from Asia and Africa, which will continue to increase in the coming decades, fuelled by the sharp demographic increase, political instability, poverty and the climatic changes besieging these regions. In other words, what is about to happen in the coming decades is a replacement of the indigenous population, with unforeseen political and social consequences⁹⁸.

8.3.2. Consequences from the Re-composition of the Population in the EU Member States

The same phenomenon of the rapid increase of the predominantly Muslim immigrant population is observed in the throughout the EU (appendix 7). In a July 2016 research, the PEW Research Centre verifies that in recent decades, the Muslim share of the population throughout Europe grew about 1 percentage point per decade, from 4% in 1990 to 6% in 2010. This pattern is expected to continue through 2030, when Muslims are projected to make up 8% of Europe's population⁹⁹.

There are some who choosing to ignore these developments, may be led to draw the simplistic conclusion that the demographic problem will be resolved through migration. The demographic shortfall of the country however is so big that, if it is covered through massive migration, Greece will end up being a completely different country. The problem here, apart from the cultural continuity one, lies in the great difficulties this society is going to face. Cohesion would be practically impossible, when half of the population originates from Afghanistan, Syria or Africa and has a culture completely foreign to the Greek one.¹⁰⁰

This incoming change in the composition of the population is clearly one of the biggest challenges for Greece but also for a good number of the EU member states. This replacement of the indigenous population needs to be dealt with today by the political leadership of the EU member states but also from the EU. Far from being a xenophobic argument, this is a real problem according to the statistics available. It is also easy to conclude that the EU plan for intercultural dialogue will fail if the balance between culturally different populations is overturned or even changed constantly by the continuous arrival of culturally distinct and diverging cultures.

9. RESULTS

9.1. An Ethical Dilemma

⁹⁷ Lavrentzos Anastasios, 2016, op.cit

⁹⁸ Lavrentzos Anastasios, (2016), op.cit

⁹⁹ Hackett Conrad, (19 July 2016,). *5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe*, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/19/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/>

¹⁰⁰ Lavrentzos Anastasios, 2016, op.cit

There is a fundamental moral dilemma associated with the migration crisis. Should the EU, turning a blind eye to misery, show a humanistic face strictly to refugees? If the EU is determined that dire living conditions will not be recognized as degrading and possibly life threatening, then the notion of humanism becomes questionable. Distinguishing migrants between refugees and economic immigrants is in itself an ethical problem: in pure humanistic terms we cannot deny the absence of threat simply because this threat is not immediate and also deny a better future to people fleeing from dire living conditions. It seems that although the declared EU values as set out in the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty of the EU, mentions the European humanistic inheritance, this inheritance is not a global common good, as it is proven that this humanism is primarily intended for the EU citizens.

9.2. A Controversial Line Between Ethics and Reality

If this is true and the human face of the EU is not to be shown to all, simply because of the vast numbers of immigrants, then the same could apply even to refugees when their number exceeds the capacities of the EU. The EU and the EU member states must come to terms with the current and most importantly the future situation as there will be a point where realities will prevail over values. The continued struggle of many European countries, such as Greece, to provide for the absolutely basic needs of the arriving people, clearly illustrate that there is a limit to what Europe can handle. The EU Commission and the EU member states will eventually find out where this limit is.

Although values should be upheld, the ways of upholding these values should be flexible enough to meet realities. Much to their credit, most of the biggest EU member states, like France and Germany, remain firm in their commitment to the EU values, and state that the restrictive measures in border controls and in receiving refugees, thus limiting their burden sharing, will remain in place only for as long as it is deemed absolutely necessary. For the moment however, it escapes their attention that these measures have a huge impact on the EU member states located at the EU borders. Kind words are not enough. Choices are hard and so far some EU member states don't seem to be interested if the declared EU values are violated inside the EU, as long as it is not done within their territory.

Internally, the real issue for the EU is how to proportionately share the burden, both fiscally and in terms of refugee quota. To that point, both the EU Commission and the countries located far from the border, have failed their EU partners at the border. This is the critical point where the EU policies fail, and where the Union begins to tear and consequently the EU structure starts to disintegrate.

9.3. Various Levels of Reactions

At a national level but also at a personal one, the perception of the risk incurred by the migration crisis depends on the nationality, social background, economic status and even political affiliation. Unfortunately the debate over this issue has offered a fertile ground for manipulation of the public. Luckily not all EU citizens have fallen victims to populists. It is normal though that they might feel

uncomfortable and concerned simply because this risk is an involuntary one. This concern is not only recorded by EUROSTAT data. It is also evident in the national and local elections. Fortunately however, the phenomenon of violent manifestations is not yet frequent.

9.4. Conflicting Interests Within the EU

The EU seems divided in the face of difficulties and the impression given is that this Union is only functioning well, in times of prosperity and calm. However, signing a contract and moreover joining a Union entails that, decisions are made in common, based on the will to protect common goods, attain common goals or face common challenges.

At least in the case of this migration crisis, the EU has proved that its members are still reasoning or regional or even individual terms. In this conflict the EU member states of the North, use their advantage of being far from the border, as well as their economic supremacy to impose their policy. Initially the Dublin regulations were drafted to protect northern countries from the influx of migrants from Eastern Europe and practically, constituted a concession of the southern countries to their northern EU partners. Now that the tables are turned, these regulations seem far from fair. Now, the EU is divided in “innocent” countries and in “guilty” countries which failed to protect the wealth of the first ones, from desperate migrants. This by itself creates a moral and a serious political issue and dispute.

Consequently, the countries of first entry, frequently overwhelmed by the flows but also by the lack of solidarity, seek every window of opportunity that they can get, in order to change their situation both legally but also on the ground. Between the two sides, one can find the EU member states of transit, which either stay apathetic or resort to extreme measures in order to make sure that they are spared both from the blame and from the burden.

Perhaps this is where the critical point lies: burden sharing. Forsaken promises of solidarity, unfair accusations, rogue alliances and arbitrary measures are the new rules in this fight to avoid sharing any part of the burden. It is evident now that the EU is missing a clear set of “EU overarching public interests”. Instead, the current situation is characterized by conflicting national interests, which is exactly what the EU had hoped to limit in the beginning of its creation.

9.5. An EU without Proper Mechanisms and Vision

It is now clear that for the EU to reach the point of taking tangible steps towards any kind of solution, nations need to relinquish some of their sovereign rights to the European Union authorities. Of course an ideal EU should also protect the interests of its members, especially in the international arena. The lack of a powerful and efficient common foreign and security policy, that would have allowed the EU to

deal with the problem before the waves of migrants reached the EU borders, indicate exactly the impact that this absence of common action has. Despite the recent action of the European External Service, the EU still has few early-warning systems in place to predict mass movements before they happen, and even fewer tools capable enough to manage the crisis. As a consequence, today the EU seems to be lacking both a plan of how to implement its strategy and a common incentive.

On the other hand, the EU Commission, seems poised to proceed with the implementation of policies and procedures that were designed and could be applied in times of relative calmness. It has now become evident that the system and policy in place for handling asylum requests as well as handling illegal migrants was not designed to cope with massive arrivals. Even worse, the urgent mitigation measures that promised Greece some hundreds of asylum processing officers resulted in just some 32 policemen. EU is still trying to push forward with a failing system and seems regrettably unable to rapidly adapt it in the face of this failure.

9.6. An EU System Adapting Too Little and Too Slow

Instead of dealing with the problem, the EU member states seem divided and fighting each other in a struggle to change the legal provisions of the Dublin System, with the EU Commission playing the role of the referee. Although the inability of the Dublin System to efficiently meet the challenges of the current circumstances proves that this system is a relic of former migration crisis and eras, the EU member states seem to deny the reality that demands immediate or even better pre-emptive action. The repeated amendments of the Dublin System, in 2003 and 2013 prove the incapacity of the EU member states to reach a commonly agreed solution based on solidarity and fairness. Even the Early Warning and Preparedness and Asylum Crisis Prevention mechanism proposed by the EU Commission, has no real power as its recommendations are not binding for the EU members.

Negotiating the Dublin III regulation or any new one, will take time. Experience has shown that the EU structure and decision making process is notoriously slow. Nevertheless, time is not a luxury that the EU can afford now, and even worse: is running out fast.

9.7. Looking at the Tip of the Iceberg

The UNHCR data confirm that the current flow of refugees will continue in the long run. Out of the 63 million around the world, some 25 million displaced persons are found on the EU's doorstep. For these refugees located on the rim of the European continent, patience is running out as they are considered guests not entitled to a refugee formal legal status and rights. Exactly these are the rights that would allow them to permanently stay in the countries where they have found shelter initially.

Apart from the high number of displaced persons, the EU must take into account also the numbers of immigrants. We live in a world of profound inequalities, where some humans are healthy, well fed and pampered by technology, while the vast

majority is doomed to live lives that are poor, unpleasant, brutal and short¹⁰¹. In a world, of scarce water resources, overpopulation, widespread diseases, deforestation, pollution, and climate change¹⁰², it is the rich that will eventually work out ways to limit the threat and protect their public goods threatened by these risks.

The poor, unable to cope with these threats will choose to migrate out of desperation or resort to violence. In short, even if the most of the conflicts were resolved, the EU would still have to face a massive wave of immigrants. The EU member states must not be fooled to believe that Mediterranean Sea or troops will be enough to keep migrants out. “*Geography still matters, but it no longer provides a safe haven for any state*” (Martin Shubik, 1997). Let’s face it: there is no way for the civilized western societies to stop the migration flows of desperate people, without violating the principles that define them and which they have pledged to respect. The results can be seen on the external borders of the EU. With the current processes and standards, efficiently processing this huge number of migrants is a task almost impossible for any nation alone. Moreover, the fact that most of these migrants will not return to their countries and are here to stay, indicates the long term character of the impact. The problem of migration is here to stay and it will not be manageable if the EU and the EU members insist on the same collective and individual policy.

9.8. Avoiding Failed or Legally Controversial Practices

Although it is evident that the situation has become very urgent, the EU member states and the EU Commission have been very slow in helping their fellow EU members located at the border, to handle a problem that should be considered as an EU problem. Disappointingly, certain EU member states have not even succeeded in efficient information sharing among their security services. The EU Crisis management system still needs to be improved but also to become inclusive. Instead of that, some EU member states, erroneously believing that they can fend off the migrant flows with fences and troops on their borders, resort to arbitrary measures.

However, the use of force against unarmed refugees does not only belong to another era. It also violates international and EU laws. EU member states need to realize that in a more inter-connected, inter-dependent and mobile world, waiting to deal with a problem until it reaches a country’s borders is not sustainable. Evidently the EU governments and the EU Commission must come up with a new comprehensive crisis management policy and to do it fast.

9.9. Assessing the Multicultural Society Model

The EU public is rightfully alarmed by the numbers of the migrants arriving, the projected increase of these flows in the future and the realization that these people are here to stay. What is even more alarming is the perceived level of difficulties EU

¹⁰¹ Robert D. Kaplan, 2000, *The Coming Anarchy*

¹⁰² Oli Brown in the UNPD “*Human Development 2007/2008*” predicts 200 million environmental migrants per 2050: page 2. The UNPD is contemplating three scenarios: “*the Good, The Bad and The Ugly*”. According to the “Good” scenario these figure might be excessive, but according to the “Ugly” scenario “*predictions of 200 million people displaced by climate change might easily be exceeded*”: pages 19-21. Source: https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/climate_forced_migration.pdf

societies will face in integrating such big numbers of people of various cultures. Although the vast majority of migrants are Muslims, their various cultures are diverging even internally and sometimes conflicting, not only with the European one but also among the various nationalities and sects. Most of the western European countries have already had a bad experience from previous failed integration efforts and fear that these mistakes will be repeated. Immigrant “welfare” ghettos are a living proof that the migrants arriving may potentially end up in social exclusion, which in turn leads to frustration and anger. This explosive cocktail could easily lead to delinquency and radicalization. Early signs of this delinquency have already made their appearance in the host countries, in Cologne, in Austria and in Sweden. It is evident that the multicultural society model has not been successful. Therefore it is logical to assume that this massive migration will eventually create a rift in the EU member states societies.

9.10. EU and Muslim Civilizations Clashing in Europe

Disappointingly, the findings of the PEW Research Centre confirm that a clash of civilizations is already unfolding in the EU, between westerners and Muslims. Although the expression of this clash is not yet a violent one, it is verified that negative perceptions about westerners are widespread among Muslims living in the EU, while there is a mutual feeling of mistrust among the two groups.

Quite alarmingly research findings indicate that there is also a rise in the level of radicalization among the Muslim communities. Consequently, it has to be acknowledged that there is indeed a security concern related to the Muslim migrants arriving. The participation of current migrants in terrorist actions is minimal, since nearly all terrorist attacks in France, the UK, Belgium or Germany were perpetrated by second or third generation Muslim immigrants. One can speculate that in the long run, the massive arrival of Muslim migrants will aggravate the problem of terrorism. While no one can claim that all Muslim migrants will be radicalized and will resort to terrorism, it must not be overlooked that there is a serious issue of a cultural gap.

9.11. Potential Benefits

It is noteworthy that, this crisis could also bring some new opportunities for the economy. Such new opportunities relate primarily to the compensation of the shrinking labor force, the strengthening of the economy in the face of younger and dynamic contenders and the increase of the public purse. Skilled workers, especially have become the prize in this effort to benefit from migration. Regrettably, it seems that there is an uneven allocation of skilled migrant labor across the EU member states. In essence it is mainly the wealthier EU member states which can benefit from migration and that is only possible through a cautiously regulated process. For the poorer countries that already see their indigenous skilled labor migrating, the arrival of even more unskilled labor is not beneficial.

In short, the economic benefits from migration will be limited only in some countries. Additionally, these economic benefits must also be balanced with the risks in other domains, such as security or even social stability. These domains might seem

to be currently irrelevant with the economy, but in the long term they could end up having a serious impact.

9.12. Transforming Societies and Demographics

The distance between the cultures can easily be illustrated by the question so frequently posed lately: “what is moral and what is not?” Moreover, is it possible that the Muslim migrants, segregated from the society, will gradually demand that they live according to the Shari’a and not state laws. Such cases have been confirmed by the recent findings of researchers in the UK.

Another alarming issue relates to the demographic realities of the population in a number of EU member states. Although the demographic decline of the EU nations and the difficulties of regenerating an ever aging population were recognized some years back, this migration crisis has added another dimension to the problem. EUROSTAT data confirm that the EU population is not just shrinking. Its composition is drastically changed by new arrivals of people, who are in their majority younger, more fertile and more dynamic.

This mix of people would not be alarming, if the culture of the migrants was similar to the one of the host nation e.g, Polish migrants to the UK or Greek migrants to France or Germany. The concern derives from the divergence between the arriving cultures and that of the host nation. Moreover, there is an issue of culture compatibility of the arriving cultures among them.

As the migrant populations will gradually change the composition of the population, it will be increasingly difficult not only to maintain the dream of a Europe where people would preserve their country’s identity and culture, but even to achieve a minimum of intercultural dialogue. The EU plan for intercultural dialogue will fail if the balance between culturally distinct populations is overturned or even changed constantly by the continuous arrival of culturally diverging cultures. Far from being a xenophobic argument, this is a real problem according to the statistics available. “*Civilizations die from suicide, not by murder*”¹⁰³ .

9.13. The Vicious Circle of the Lack of Integration and Unemployment

In the past decades European countries had hoped that the all the problems mentioned above would be resolved through successful integration. The integration, in which western societies had so much invested on, seems to be failing at least in some cases for example in Sweden and in France. Still a disappointing number of second and third generation migrants of third countries, lives in the “welfare” ghettos of western countries and is characterized by prolonged unemployment, low level education and delinquency.

¹⁰³ Sicard Claude, Le Figaro, 2016, *Islam et Occident : une petite histoire du «choc des civilisations»*, http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/2016/01/21/31002-20160121ARTFIG_00170_-islam-et-occident-une-petite-histoire-du-choc-des-civilisations.php

Contrary to the US model where there is no alternative for survival other than getting a job, EU former migrants know that they are entitled to a level of services and support even if they are unemployed. Since finding a job demands an effort to integrate, most of these former migrants enter a vicious circle where the absence of integration forbids them from working, and unemployment prevents any further integration. State welfare benefits are the energy that keeps this wheel turning, as any interruption of the provision of services and basic goods would eventually lead people either to work, or back to their home countries.

Regardless of the reasons, the issue remains that big numbers of migrants end up in fringe communities, which gradually become alienated of the society of the country. Obviously the integration policy adopted so far, relying mainly on state funding, needs to be improved or completely changed.

9.14. Intercultural Dialogue: An EU Plan Too Ambitious to Succeed

The EU recognizing the shortcoming, instead of continuing the effort to integrate migrants is opting for a new plan. The EU hopes that the new way to success will pass through an intercultural dialogue, that seeks to find common ground between different cultures, communities, and people, thus bringing them closer. This plan however is based first on the harmonious coexistence of the migrant communities with the local societies. Secondly it must be grounded on the will of all parties to enter into this process. The plan however, due to its nature follows a lengthy process that has just started and has yet to prove that it can be effective. The PEW Research Centre findings indicate that perhaps there is little will from the side of the Muslim migrants to enter into this kind of dialogue. Once again, time is running out and the EU cannot afford to lose another generation of migrants.

9.15. Failure of Leadership

On the same line, the will of the EU citizens to enter into an intercultural dialogue should not be taken for granted. It has been confirmed that the issue of migration creates concerns almost to all of the EU public, regardless of the legitimacy of their arguments. As a first reaction, instead of questioning “how can we find lasting solutions?” most are tempted to question: “how do we stop the flows from coming?” As most of citizens are already aware of the reality that these flows will not stop, they experience uncertainty in the face of the unknown. It is this uncertainty that populists exploit in order to gain public approval and votes. On the other hand, this effort to trigger xenophobic and racist sentiments has not been met with any organized response. It has been the failure of the EU Commission and the EU governments to communicate the correct messages that has left room for xenophobia and racism to directly challenge the values of the EU.

9.16. Deconstructing a Dream

The messages that are intentionally or not conveyed by the EU reaction to this crisis, have been received by the EU public as well as by all players in the international arena. For the EU public the situation seems disappointing, as their elected representatives both in the EU and their national parliaments have failed to

find effective ways to prevent and manage the crisis. The impression given by the EU is that, structurally it does not perform well under stress. This has already been proven during the recent economic crisis, when measures came too late and too short of expectations. The EU public is just witnessing the same thing all over again. The EU reactions are too little and too late.

Gradually EU citizens lose any trust that they might have had in the EU as an institution. Their national governments reclaim their old status as a champion that they can follow in order to face challenges or even other EU member states. The hard won sentiment of unity, that was present in the EU in the 80s and throughout the 90s, is contested. At least a part of the EU public considers that the EU is no longer a Union to their interest. That is also confirmed by the results of the BREXIT referendum, the Greek vote against the EU inspired bailout plan and the ease with which Hungary organized a referendum to vote against the EU policy on migration. The hypothesis that centrifuge forces exist in the EU is confirmed. These are clear signs of disintegration.

9.17. A Discredited Power

This message of lacking unity is also received by all partners and contenders at the international level. US, Russian and Chinese leaders seek contact with the leaders of the strongest countries and rarely discuss or negotiate crucial issues with the EU Commission. For them it seems that the notion of the EU as a single power, capable to implement policy and achieve results, is void. To them the EU seems to be a group of countries that need to be led by the strongest country and not an alliance of equals. Other contenders, like Turkey have sensed this weakness and capitalize on it. To give an example of the weakness projected by the EU, it would worth imagining the reaction of the US, if Mexican authorities fomented human trafficking and asked money in exchange for controlling the traffickers. It would be equally interesting to imagine the Turkish demands if instead of the EU, Russia was on the other side of the Aegean Sea.

Again in the international area, EU member states like Greece, which see their rights, legal both according to International and European Law, being sacrificed instead of being defended, will be tempted to feel that they would be better off protecting their own interests without resorting to an unreliable Union. These are messages the EU should avoid sending out, especially in times when challenges are constantly multiplying almost in every domain. The declared vision of the EU founders in the 50s, was to forge a Union that would give special privileges to no one. It was meant to create a Union that would be respected by all partners and rivals. For the moment and after these two consecutive crises, the EU image seems to be blemished.

9.18. Last Call

It is precisely this vulnerability that could be the trigger point for improvement. Any failure revealed, if properly analyzed, can lead to mitigation measures, new tactics and finally new solutions. This is exactly the point in which this

crisis could prove beneficial for the EU. The EU is now in limbo between disintegration and closer unity. Properly exploited, this crisis could result in improving the fundamental decision making process of the EU, the cohesion of the EU members and last but not least, in making the EU voice and status stronger. The recent move of the European External Agency to publish a Global Strategy and the planned establishment of an EU Coastguard are indicative of the beneficial changes that can be triggered.

Resolving internal disputes, bringing together diverging trends and taking decisive action is a prerequisite for success. From this perspective, the migration crisis is an opportunity that EU leaders must seize, for there probably will not be a second one.

10. OVERALL APPRECIATION OF THE FINDINGS

Based on the results of this analysis, it is evident that the current migration crisis constitutes a major challenge for the EU. Slowly however it is becoming evident that the EU has just seen the tip of the iceberg. The continuing conflicts, the climatic change and various other reasons make certain that large numbers of migrants will continue coming in the EU in the future. Restrictive measures, like fences and troops, eventually will prove inefficient in the face of the vast numbers of migrants. Although the size of the EU 28 population is impressive, the numbers of refugees that will arrive in a relatively short period, for example till 2050, is equally impressive. Simply because of the size of the migration flows, their impact will surely shape the EU societies, as well as the economy and the character of the Union.

It has been proven that there are economic benefits to be made from the arrival of young migrants. Nevertheless these benefits cannot be considered solely in economic terms, without taking into consideration the problems that need to be resolved. In the long run and strictly in terms of funds, any potential economic benefits will have to be measured against the funds that will be allocated for solving the problems caused. Furthermore it is far from certain that any problem can be solved with money.

The arrival of so many Muslim migrants will not be easy to absorb and the smooth coexistence of distinct cultures is not likely to succeed. The EU as a whole but also EU member states individual governments must find the golden solution between cultural and religious freedom from the one side and respect of the Law on the other. Although most of the predominately Christian population of the EU has adopted the secular model of governance, where religion has no leading role in the state business, it is doubtful if the arriving Muslims will equally chose to relinquish their main source of identity and viewpoint for the sake of social peace. Regrettably it has been proven that the EU is already experiencing a clash of civilization on its own ground and that the expressions of this clash are gradually getting violent. History has shown that in most cases the peaceful coexistence of such distinct cultures sooner or later ends up in failure.

Managing risks of such magnitude will demand the commitment of all the EU members. For sure, now is the time to acknowledge mistakes of the past and take bold decisions. Unresolved issues that had been overlooked for a long time, now demand urgent solutions. It must be assumed that both the Dublin System and the integration process followed so far are obsolete and have failed. The EU needs to seek a new vision and strategy and come up with a realistic and effective action plan. The new European Global Strategy, the creation of the new European Coastguard and the EU declared will to work closer with its neighbors in combating the causes of migration, are steps to the right direction. Whatever the measures however, they need time in order to bring results and one cannot hope that they will put a complete halt to migration.

Effective common policy and action will require concessions from all sides. The EU and the EU member states governments however are notorious for being slow in decision making. The success of any measures decided will depend on the radical change of mindset of the EU member states and on the speed of their implementation. Luckily the EU citizens and migrants alike, seem ready and willing to play a positive role in this crisis. Right there is where a window of opportunity that could make a difference appears. The EU and its member states have a moral obligation not to let their people down this time since this will probably be the last call for the EU.

In realistic terms however, even if the EU comes up with an efficient approach and action plan, the flows of migrants will not be stopped. The EU message promising a better future to all those who come aboard is simply too strong to be ignored by the millions looking for hope. For all its power and wealth, the only thing the EU will buy with these planned measures is time. This time however, is absolutely vital for the Union to overcome its internal problems, avoid disintegration and prepare EU societies for the inevitable changes to come.

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
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APPENDICES


.1 European Migrant Crisis 2015: Number of Refugees and Top Countries of Origin



Source FRONTEX 2015


2. List of European Citizens Concerns by Gravity

QA5. What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?




Source: Standard Eurobarometer 83 Spring 2015

.3 Unemployment Rate by Country in the EU 2015




Source Eurostat 2015

.4 Characteristics Associated with Westerners and Muslims




Source PEW Research Centre, Michael Lipka 22/07/2016

.5 Number of Suspects Arrested for Religiously Inspired Jihadist Terrorism 2011 to 2015.



Source: Europol 2016


.6 Fertility Rates in EU Countries in 2010



Source: ESPON 2016

.7 Impact of Migration on EU Population in 2050

Impact of migration on population in 2050




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Regional level, NUTS 2
 Source: ESPON 2013 Database 2010
 Origin of data: Eurostat, NSIs, Estimations, 2009-2010
 © EuroGeographics Association for administrative boundaries

Impact of Migration on Population in 2050



Impact of migration on population in 2050, calculated as the difference in population between the *Status Quo* and *No Migration* scenarios in % of the population in the *No Migration* scenario

Source: ESPON 2016