


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### Tanzanian foreign policy: The proportions of autonomy

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# TANZANIAN FOREIGN POLICY

## THE PROPORTIONS OF AUTONOMY

**CHRISTOS. A. FRANGONIKOLOPOULOS**

**T**ANZANIAN FOREIGN POLICY has over the years achieved a margin of autonomy in international affairs which is out of proportion to its national power.<sup>1</sup> The triangular principles of Tanzanian foreign policy as stipulated in the Arusha Declaration of 1967 are as follows:

- (i) to cooperate with all political parties in Africa engaged in the liberation of Africa;
- (ii) to see that the Government cooperates with other states in Africa in bringing about African unity; and
- (iii) to see the government works tirelessly towards world peace and security.<sup>2</sup>

To understand why this has been the case one has to examine the evolution of Tanzanian foreign policy within the context in which the United Republic of Tanzania emerged, and the problems—domestic and external—it faced and had to overcome as a nation in its first few years of independence. This is not to deny, however, that Tanzania did not emerge as an independent nation in 1961 strongly dedicated to the principles mentioned above. Rather domestic and external problems of the 1960s contributed to the determination to hold a foreign policy of positive non-alignment, and also caused a change in strategy for achieving these objectives.

### **Tanzanian domestic and foreign policy, 1961–66**

Scholars identify the mid-1960s as a turning point in the development of Tanzania's foreign policy. Hoskyns for example, suggests that the mid-1960s marked the beginning of a new period in foreign policy orientation, to break free from traditional links and pursue policies reflecting Tanzania's own domestic and foreign policy values.<sup>3</sup> Niblock, on the other hand, while acknowledging that there was a genuine attempt at pursuing independent-minded policies since 1961, contends that the mid-1960s marked the end of a 'less

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active' phase and the beginning of a 'more active' one.<sup>4</sup> C. Pratt suggests a 'loss of innocence' on the part of Nyerere, which compelled him to reassess his foreign policy—a change in what could be expected from British and Western policy in Africa.<sup>5</sup> Parallel to this emerged a firm and profound commitment to seeking a socialist transformation of Tanzania, which would create a practical and purposeful linkage between domestic and external policies.

Tanganyika<sup>6</sup> became independent in December 1961, and found itself in a situation of 'factual subordination' in all major fields of public life. Expatriates, most of them British, occupied 75 per cent of the middle and senior ranks of the civil service in 1961. This close dependence upon Britain was also reflected in the foreign capital assistance received by Tanzania during these years. Of a total of just under £15 million of external development revenues received by Tanzania between 1961–65, over £10 million were from Britain.<sup>7</sup> At trade level in 1961, more than a third of Tanzania's exports went to the UK, with another third going to Western industrialized countries. In 1961 Tanzania imported 72 per cent of its goods from the West, of which more than half came from Britain.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, under the strong influence of Britain and the World Bank, Tanzania embarked on a path of capitalist development. This meant channelling expenditure into productive investments; rapid agricultural growth; and heavy reliance upon external funds. Widespread benefits, however, did not occur. Increasing reliance on Western aid and trade meant that manufacturing enterprises established in Tanzania exhibited a monopolistic tendency. This obviously was not conducive to creating a nationally integrated economy. Technology was import intensive; industrial contribution to GDP remained at low levels, 8.1 per cent in 1965–67.<sup>9</sup> At the same time agricultural production only increased by 4.3 per cent per year.<sup>10</sup> Given this situation, the Tanzanian government in 1967, instituted a self-reliant and socialist path to development. This 'loss of innocence' (using Pratt's phrase), however, cannot be fully explained unless examined in relation to the army mutiny of 1964, and a series of crises in Tanzania's relations with Britain and other Western countries.

The army mutiny of 1964 exposed the shallow power and subordination of the country to Britain, the consequence of which was 'a serious crisis of national self-confidence'.<sup>11</sup> On the one hand, it was an indication of the resentment against the economic policy of the government. On the other hand, it was also indicative of the lack of Africanization in the army—its officer corps being predominantly British. Moreover, Nyerere's decision to invite 1400 British commandos to disarm Tanzanian soldiers further exposed the fickleness of national power and independence. Tanzania as a result took advantage of the mutiny to end military dependence on Britain, a reaction based on the 'determination not to permit Western pressure to dissuade the nation from formulating essentially independent decisions'.<sup>12</sup>

For Tanzania's foreign policy in the period 1961–66, non-alignment was the guiding principle. Appearing before the UN after retaining independence Nyerere declared:

Our policy is one of non-alignment in world quarrels which do not concern us, and that policy will remain. If any nation tries to buy our

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votes at the UN—with that nation we shall quarrel. If any nation uses their aid as a basis for interference in our affairs, we shall refuse that aid . . .<sup>13</sup>

Within the tenets of non-alignment Tanzania recognized the Republic of China; announced her withdrawal from the Royal East African Navy in 1961; rejected a prospective offer of association with the EEC in 1962; undertook international initiatives in attempts to mediate between India and China (1962), and between Holland and New Guinea (1962); refused, through the Nyerere doctrine, to accept all commitments which Britain had made on her behalf before independence; and, finally, demonstrated determination to diversify sources of aid and trade.<sup>14</sup> At the same time Tanzania became identified with the commitment of achieving freedom in the white-dominated regimes of Southern Africa. In March 1961, Nyerere made it clear that Tanzania would not be a member of the Commonwealth if South Africa remained. In July 1963, Nyerere visited Britain, the USA, and Canada in the hope of encouraging these powers to put pressure on South Africa. Moreover, in 1963 Tanzania introduced a boycott on the import of all South African goods.

Non-alignment, however, proved unrealistic, and contradictory. As Nnoli rightly argues, the philosophy and morality of non-alignment was far removed from Tanzania's national power and capabilities, and did not extend beyond Nyerere's personal faith in the morality of the international community.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, as Pratt suggests, Nyerere's perception of world politics was underlain by a close association with Britain and the West. The following statement was made by Nyerere on the occasion of the opening of the University College, Dar es Salaam, financed by British and American agencies:

The world is divided into various conflicting groups, and each one of these groups is anxious for allies in Africa . . . The desire to help the United Republic in our economic struggle—even the desire for friendship with us—these things come second to what the other nation believes to be in its own interests . . . We have to recognize that some overseas nations will help us if they can, and if they do not believe that they will harm themselves while doing so; other nations will help us solely in the hope of some kind of return to themselves . . .<sup>16</sup>

The context in which the statement was made, allows one to argue that Nyerere perceived of the UK and the USA as nations that would help, not because they could see some direct return, but 'rather as sympathetic countries who would be expected to help Tanzania as long as they did not thereby harm themselves'.<sup>17</sup> Certain crises in Tanzania's relations with the West, however, led to a reassessment.

The union with Zanzibar (1964), had repercussions upon Tanzania's foreign policy. Tanzania suddenly became a contested arena in the Cold War. The West saw the union as engendering the penetration of communism given the revolutionary Marxist character of Zanzibar, and the external links it had established with China and East Germany—the latter being the first country to support Zanzibar politically and financially. On the other hand, given its colonial links, Tanganyika had developed close contacts with West Germany. Moreover, the

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promulgation of the Hallstein Doctrine (1955), by the West German government meant that West Germany would neither establish, nor maintain close relations with a state that had relations with East Germany. Given the substantial amount of aid West Germany contributed—for 1965 she had promised over £3 million of arms and instruction for the mainland army, as well as a £6 million economic and aid programme<sup>18</sup>—Tanzania's search for a common policy on the German question led to protracted negotiations. In the end it was decided to limit the status of the East German representation to that of an unofficial Consulate General in Dar es Salaam. To this the West German government objected, and as a result recalled its naval and air training personnel, and announced that there would be no new official aid. Tanzania in turn ordered the withdrawal of all West German technical assistance personnel—an action that clearly illustrates the need to confirm, reaffirm and give non-alignment a stronger and positive role. Why?

On the one hand, given Tanzania's dependence on Western aid, the German issue illustrated that Tanzania would not compromise her principles for military or economic loans, no matter how much these loans were needed. The Tanzanian decision, as regards West Germany, was explained by Nyerere in these terms:

By withdrawing the military aid first and leaving the other form of aid for later action, the Germans hoped that this threat would make us change our decision . . . We decided to remove all that about our attitude to economic blackmail. The current position, therefore, is that Tanzania does not recognise East Germany; it recognises West Germany . . . Aid from East Germany continues to arrive in one part of the union; no aid comes from the West German Government . . . This is a rather absurd way of demonstrating that our foreign and diplomatic position has nothing to do with aid . . .<sup>19</sup>

On the other hand, the German issue also illustrated the consequences Cold War politics could have on Tanzania. The US/Belgian intervention in the Congo (1964), followed by the Tanzanian–US diplomatic skirmish over an alleged US plot to overthrow Nyerere (1965), further strengthened this conviction. These events, along with the German issue, propelled Tanzania into an effort to define non-alignment in terms which would be tenable in this new context of heightened entanglement in the cold war.

The reaffirmation of non-alignment, and Tanzania's commitment to African liberation/unity, was also illustrated in the diplomatic break with Britain over the issue of Rhodesia (1965). Nyerere had made it a principle of his foreign policy to 'cooperate with all the political parties in Africa engaged in the liberation of Africa', and as a result offered financial, military, territorial and propaganda support to a large number of liberation movements. This was also made possible by the fact that the OAU provided for the establishment of a Liberation Committee in Tanzania (1963). Given, therefore, the centrality of African unity and freedom in Tanzania's foreign policy, the issue of Rhodesia could not but see the erosion of the relationship with Britain. This erosion began at a meeting of Commonwealth members in June 1965, during which Tanzania suggested that there should be no independence in Rhodesia before

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majority rule. The inevitable came in November 1965, when Smith declared independence—UDI. As a result of this, and given the OAU resolution of December 1965,<sup>20</sup> Tanzania became the first African country to break relations with Britain. As it turned out, the break resulted in the freezing of a £7.5 million interest free loan from Britain. This loss again illustrated that Tanzania's decision was based on political rather than economic reasons.

To sum up, it is clear that these crises demonstrated to Tanzanian leadership the potential to perceive a threatening dimension to its domestic and foreign policy. This is important given the initial acceptability and reliance on the West for aid and development. Consequently, Nyerere in a document entitled *Principles and Development* (1966), decided to articulate more clearly Tanzania's position on foreign policy '... until independence the West never had to consider Tanzania at all—it was automatically on their side. Now they find that our support is not assured—and this results in an illogical belief that we have become unfriendly. They have not yet accustomed themselves to the idea that we are independent, and that our friendship will now be genuine but our decisions will be our own'. Moreover, Tanzania initiated a change in developmental strategy to achieve these objectives.

### **Socialism, self-reliance and foreign policy**

Through the Arusha Declaration (1967), Tanzania defined a socialist and self-reliant policy that dealt with the problems discussed above. This was but a search of power from internal sources, and decisions taken in responses to the economy established a tone that has made domestic and foreign policies more or less compatible with each other. Socialism internally sought to eliminate exploitation, allow for public ownership, and finally promote a socialist belief. As a result, and on the basis of Arusha, the government inaugurated legislation which nationalized banks, insurance companies and large industrial concerns. Legislation also required TANU membership to disengage from party advantage. The government also encouraged a workers' participation programme, and the creation of communal villages—Ujamaa. At the same time self-reliance sought to augment and support socialism. Internally self-reliance hoped to allow for the efficient use of locally available resources, land and people, hence the emphasis placed on rural development. Externally self-reliance sought to establish contacts that would further Tanzania's development, and would be achieved mainly through the regulation of foreign trade and aid. Self-reliance, however, did not imply autarchy or isolationism. The leadership still foresaw a positive role for aid and foreign investment, and we shall see how it proved a contradiction in terms of its socialist, self-reliant strategy.

Socialism and self-reliance, have not, however produced the desired outcome. Internally, Tanzania still remains poor, underdeveloped, and heavily reliant on agriculture. Externally, by the late 1970s Tanzania had become more dependent on foreign aid, being the leading recipient of World Bank loans and credits in sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, since 1974, government policies have pointed 'towards less control and greater reliance on individual initiative'.<sup>21</sup> The emphasis on a communal mode of production in rural areas

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has been relaxed. The government has also encouraged private individual entrepreneurship in both the agricultural and the industrial sectors. Considering these apparent contradictions, Crouch identifies seven factors to explain the failure of Arusha, the most important being the failure to emphasize growth.<sup>22</sup> Nyerere's thoroughgoing egalitarianism meant that while Tanzania made considerable strides in the provision of basic social services, at the same time she diverted finance, personnel, and resources away from directly productive activities, therefore, weakening the country's economic/growth performance. The government as a result, allowed for increasing aid, which meant that Tanzanian development predicated on external support, rather than self-reliance. R. H. Green suggests that external/international factors have influenced Tanzania's effort to develop a self-reliant strategy. These factors are as follows: the oil and drought crises of the 1970s; the accumulation of deficits for Third World countries; the disintegration of the East African Community (1977); and the intervention in Uganda (1979).<sup>23</sup>

Externally, despite this poor economic record, Tanzania has managed to introduce elements of change in her foreign policy. The adoption of a socialist development strategy entailed reducing ties with Western donors, and diversifying her sources of aid and trade. Britain's share of the Tanzanian MKT declined in 1961/77 by more than 60 per cent, whereas China's exports accounted for about 20 per cent of Tanzania's total imports in 1973.<sup>24</sup> Equally noteworthy is the extent to which Tanzania has succeeded in forging trade links with smaller European countries. Scandinavian countries for example, increased their share of exports from \$7 million in 1970 to \$70 million in 1980.<sup>25</sup> Tanzania has also made efforts to expand trading links with other Third World countries, as illustrated in the following contexts.

- Tanzanian foreign policy orientation towards the collective effort to achieve a NIEO. In fact, Tanzania was one of the first countries to promote the concept of collective self-reliance within the context of NAM, UNCTAD and Group 77.<sup>26</sup>
- Involvement in programmes of technical cooperation. At a regional level Tanzania has developed important channels of cooperation (see below). At a global level, cooperation has not only been limited to joint ventures with China. Tanzania and India, for example, have actively cooperated in programmes involving exchange of technical personnel and other forms of assistance. In 1972, India gave Tanzania a loan of \$63 million for the development of the Kagera Sugar Scheme. Tanzania has also received various forms of assistance from Mexico and Cuba.<sup>27</sup>

These efforts, however, have not constituted a major shift. In 1977 Western countries accounted for 69 per cent of Tanzania's imports and 78 per cent of her exports.<sup>28</sup> On the one hand, Tanzania became increasingly reliant upon the West to finance its growing import surplus. On the other hand, Tanzania's capacity to monitor and coordinate its trade relations was limited.<sup>29</sup> In line with these developments, Tanzania also failed to diversify its sources of aid away from Western countries. Considering technical assistance in 1976, 78 per cent was supplied by Western countries, as compared to 5 per cent from socialist countries.<sup>30</sup> However, what is significant about this aid is that it does not come

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from major Western countries. Indeed, one could argue that diversification to include some smaller Western powers was the 'most dramatic and sustained change in Tanzania's aid relations after the Arusha Declaration'.<sup>31</sup> By 1979, for example, British aid accounted for a mere 6 per cent of Tanzania's total aid, compared with as much as 53 per cent in 1964. Within this context Scandinavian countries have proved particularly generous, disbursing about 30 per cent of Tanzania's assistance in 1970/79. Canada and the Netherlands have also increased their aid from \$2 million in grants and loans in 1971 to \$70 million in 1979.

On the one hand, it could be argued that aid from smaller European countries has neutralized the control position of the major powers, thus, underlining Tanzania's policy of non-alignment. On the other hand, Tanzania has been more dependent on foreign aid in the post-Arusha period, thus, diverting her from her self-reliant strategy. First, it allowed Tanzania to forge its pace of development at a quicker rate than could be sustained by the economy. The failure to sustain a high level of savings—6 per cent in 1978—meant that Western aid increasingly paid for the implementation of Tanzania's development strategy. Second, projects financed by donors reinforced the country's dependence and even integration to the capitalist system. Donors emphasized expensive, capital intensive technologies, and as a result diverted Tanzania from the Arusha Declaration's emphasis upon agriculture. Whereas spending on industry increased from 2 per cent in 1970 to 20 per cent in 1980, agriculture's share fell from 20 per cent in 1965 to 10 per cent in 1979.<sup>32</sup>

To sum up, one could argue that self-reliance in Tanzania proved a 'psychological move signifying an emotional break with the West, not a coherent strategy'.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the changes that were introduced as a result of socialism and self-reliance. Efforts to diversify sources of aid reduced dependence on major Western donors, and also allowed Tanzania to orient its foreign policy towards issues of economic nature, as exemplified by her support for NIEO, and commitment to regional and global cooperation with other Third World countries. These policies did not, however, constitute a major shift, and Tanzania has been more dependent on aid in the post-Arusha period—a dependence that has allowed for many changes in terms of her development strategy (see below).

### **Tanzanian foreign policy**

Tanzania's dependence on aid has had no impact on the direction of her foreign policy, and her commitment to non-alignment. African unity/liberation, has been just as strong as it was in the pre-Arusha period. This section draws attention to her policy of non-alignment, and her active, sometimes controversial, involvement in African affairs.

#### *Non-alignment*

As we have seen, Tanzania's efforts to diversify her sources of aid and trade neutralized the control position of the major Western powers. Following the diplomatic skirmish with the USA (1964), relationships have remained proper

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but never particularly close. The US contribution of aid dropped from 13 per cent of Tanzania's total receipts in 1964, to 6 per cent in 1979. A comparable pattern is also illustrative in her relationship with the USSR. The two had signed an economic assistance agreement in the 1960s, but given Tanzania's relationship with China, and the USSR's support for the regime of Amin, most of the projects agreed were not completed. Assistance from the USSR in the 1970s was a mere \$6 million.<sup>34</sup> As regards Britain, Tanzania re-established relations in 1968, and did so only after the British accepted the principle of majority rule in Rhodesia. Moreover, aid did not resume until 1974, and as we have seen above it was well below the pre-1965 level.

Some scholars would have us believe that it is not possible to talk in terms of non-alignment, for by 1970 Tanzania had become so dependent on China that it had actually entered into an alliance.<sup>35</sup> The Tanzanian-Chinese relationship developed in the 1960s out of Nyerere's personal interest in the Chinese model of development, and the willingness China showed in financing the TAZARA railway. China's decision to build the railway led to a dramatic increase in aid and trade contracts between the two countries. Development aid alone accounted for about 400 million Shs by the early 1970s.<sup>36</sup> Tanzania's imports from China were especially high, ranging from 14 per cent in 1970 to 22 per cent in 1973.<sup>37</sup> On the other hand, Tanzania's exports to China accounted for only 5 per cent of her total exports.<sup>38</sup> Since 1964, the scale of Chinese military assistance also grew enormously. China took over from Canada in 1970, and has supplied a large amount of weaponry, trained Tanzanian pilots, and also assisted liberation movements based in Tanzania—estimated in 1972 at \$41 million for FRELIMO.<sup>39</sup> However, rather than violating the principle of non-alignment, Tanzania's relationship with China confirmed it. The government, aware of the dangers involved by increasing dependence on China, renewed military assistance agreements with Canada in August 1973. Moreover, trade decreased rapidly after the completion of the railway, with China's imports accounting for only 3 per cent in 1977.<sup>40</sup>

Tanzania's non-aligned policy has also meant speaking out on issues that threaten international stability. The UN in particular is an important forum from which Tanzania champions the cause of racial equality, collective self-reliance, and World peace.<sup>41</sup> Tanzania has also attached great importance to the issue of nuclear disarmament. Tanzanian diplomacy has been to support the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, to urge the UN to declare Africa a denuclearized zone, and to recognize the special responsibility of the superpowers in the field of disarmament. Along with these policies, Tanzania has also spoken against any form of foreign intervention, hoping to create a climate tolerant of different political systems. Addressing the government in 1967, Nyerere said that 'our desire for friendship does not, however, mean that we are unconcerned with world events . . . Certainly we should refrain from adverse comments on the internal affairs of other states . . . But to stay silent on such issues as Vietnam because one or more powerful nations do not like what we say would be a disgrace'.<sup>42</sup> Tanzania has also taken constructive action to release Africa from the effects of the Cold War, as exemplified in her own actions in the 1960s and her recent opposition to the Western proposal to set up a pan-African defence force (1978). We now

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examine Tanzania's involvement in Africa, which has in fact dominated the context of her foreign policy.

### *African affairs*

*Realignment and re-orientation in Tanzania's relationships with Africa.* In Africa Tanzania has set herself on a course leading to a more dynamic set of relationships, consistent with her own commitment to socialism and self-reliance. Tanzania has turned away from Kenya and Uganda, with which there had been a coordination of policy during and after British colonial rule. Despite Kenya's hegemony as the administrative capital of Britain in East Africa, Tanzania was willing to continue joint cooperation pending Kenya's and Uganda's independence. In fact, Nyerere was willing to delay Tanganyika's independence (1960), in order to allow for the establishment of an East African Federation—a thought which proved unrealistic. Tanzania increasingly questioned the unequal benefits that arose from inter-territorial arrangements, and argued in favour of a new basis for balanced cooperation. This was sought in the Kampala Agreements of 1964. In the years following the agreement regional cooperation continued to falter, while Kenya's predominance in intra-regional trade increased. Another attempt was made with the establishment of the East African Community (EAC) in 1967, intended to 'strengthen and regulate industrial, commercial and other relations of the partner states in order that there must be accelerated and sustained expansion of economic activities within East Africa, the benefits of which shall be equally distributed'.<sup>43</sup> However, despite elements of the treaty favourable to Uganda and Tanzania, Kenya continued to dominate in intraregional trade. Moreover, the will to maintain and continue the relationship within the context of the EAC was absent. Given different conceptions of development in Kenya and Tanzania, and mutually antagonistic perceptions of security needs in Uganda and Tanzania, the EAC disintegrated in June 1977.

Behind this background, and consistent with its ideological orientation, Tanzania became increasingly involved with the affairs of her southern neighbours. In addition to the TAZARA, Tanzania and Zambia have engaged in other cooperation agreements, such as the construction of an oil pipeline and an all weather paved road between Dar es Salaam and Lusaka. Support for the FRELIMO has also allowed Tanzania to establish economic contacts with Mozambique. By 1978 Tanzania was exporting to and importing from Mozambique, more than she was with any other African country. As we shall see below, Tanzania also constitutes an important political and strategic member within the Organization of Front Line States.

*Controversial issues in Tanzanian African foreign policy.* To some scholars, it seems that Tanzania's concern with fundamental principles of equality, and human dignity, along with her greater emphasis on African liberation, has undermined the unity of Africa.<sup>44</sup> It is true that Tanzania in questioning certain norms operating within the framework of the African political system, has had to make some contradictory choices. One was the recognition of Biafra (1968), which questioned the unity of the state and the non-recognition of secessionist

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movements. The recognition is difficult to explain,<sup>45</sup> and it could even be argued that it was an error. However, for Tanzania recognition was important for it illustrated that African leaders did not wield their power on behalf of their people—a moral stance reinforced by the human suffering imposed on the Biafrans prior to and during the course of the civil war. Tanzanian recognition was also a protest against foreign intervention in the crisis, as illustrated by the supply of arms from the USSR, France, Britain and Israel. Moreover, the involvement and increasing influence of South Africa and Portugal within Biafra increased the danger of either prolonging the conflict, or directing attention away from racial and colonial struggles.<sup>46</sup> Given these factors, one could argue that recognition was in accord with African unity, for in part it was designed to forestall these consequences through the achievement of a negotiated settlement.

Tanzania's intervention in Uganda and the subsequent overthrow of Amin (1979), has also raised profound issues regarding international relations of new states, and the meaning of Pan-Africanism. On the one hand, Tanzania's refusal to allow for mediation in its crisis with Uganda questioned a fundamental tenet of the UN and OAU Charters—that of non-intervention. On the other hand, a continuing Tanzanian presence in Uganda, even after the fall of Amin, questioned her role in determining the political course of Uganda. One should not deny an element of self-interest—after all Nyerere had helped Ugandan exiles in an attempt to overthrow Amin in 1972. On the other hand, it is difficult to present the Tanzanian action as a case of aggrandisement. The cost to Tanzania of keeping such a force in Uganda was enormous, about £500000 sterling per day, which also entailed a disruption in agricultural and industrial production.<sup>47</sup> One as in the case of Biafra, should be drawn to the conclusion that the humanitarian impulse played a significant role. As Thomas argues, the 'idea of regional or continental, or racial responsibility, or responsibility for allowing Amin to perpetrate atrocities on a massive scale, in a sense paved the way for concerted effort, to rid Uganda—and Africa—from Amin'.<sup>48</sup> This impulse can only be understood within the context of the OAU in the 1970s and Tanzania's role within it.

In the 1970s Nyerere was the only statesman in Africa who was prepared to expose the injustices and shortcomings of the OAU, or individual African countries. Nyerere argued that there was a double standard in the OAU. In explaining the decision to boycott the OAU Kampala summit (1975) Nyerere declared that 'Africa is in the danger of becoming unique in its refusal to protest about crimes committed against Africans, provided such actions are done by African governments'.<sup>49</sup> In a document entitled the *OAU and the Freedom Struggle* (1971), Tanzania also challenged the established OAU principles of universal membership and non-intervention. It was not enough to acquire and retain membership of the OAU—what was required in addition was commitment to African freedom and dignity, and commitment to anti-colonial and anti-racist policies.<sup>50</sup> What we, therefore, have here is a willingness to make the OAU stronger, to allow for a realization of its shortcomings, rather than allow it to take cover behind legalistic principles. Behind this background, and given the OAU response to the Ugandan intervention in Tanzania (1978), Nyerere it seems had no alternative but to act as an international vigilante, ie he thought it

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necessary to violate international law, in order to return Uganda and Africa to the rules of decency.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, Nyerere's action resulted in the shortcomings of the OAU Charter being highlighted, and possible remedies being held up for investigation. The OAU summit of 1979, rather than strongly condemning Nyerere, pressed for changes: the idea of establishing an African peace-keeping force under OAU investigation gained credibility; moreover, for the first time, African dictatorial regimes were condemned along with the white racist regimes of Southern Africa. In conclusion, it is clear that Tanzania's foreign policy has not undermined African unity, rather it initiated a realization of how to consolidate it by correcting the faults of the African political system.

*Tanzanian foreign policy in Southern Africa.* Nkrumah's dictum that 'no African state can be free if even an inch of the African continent is under a foreign yoke', has been reiterated in Tanzania's foreign policy. Her geographical position between independent Black Africa and the white-ruled regimes of Southern Africa, meant that she was strategically important for liberation movements. This factor has encouraged her to make sacrifices in order to further the cause of Southern African liberation. An action exemplifying this attitude was the diplomatic break with Britain in 1965. Tanzanian military, financial and territorial support for liberation movements, has also threatened her security. In 1981, a South African mercenary gave evidence to the fact that South Africa desired a foothold in the Seychelles in order to destabilize Tanzania.

Although the threat to Tanzanian security was, and is, real, support for liberation movements has been a continuing theme in Tanzanian foreign policy. In providing facilities and a rear base, Tanzania also progressively became more radical. In 1969, Nyerere along with other African leaders, stated in the Lusaka Manifesto, that they were willing to urge liberation movements to abandon their wars in favour of peaceful means of negotiation. By 1971, however, in the Mogadishu Declaration it was stated that '... there is no way left to the liberation of Southern Africa except armed struggle'.<sup>52</sup> Tanzania since 1963 has hosted, defended and supported the OAU Liberation Committee. She has also provided other facilities, such as security and free radio broadcasts to oppressed peoples of Southern Africa. Taking the example of FRELIMO, during its 13 year war effort, Tanzania provided it with physical access to Mozambique, and also allowed the establishment of bases on her territory. Moreover, Tanzania declared 1974 as the 'year of liberation' for Mozambique, followed with voluntary Tanzanian participation in the liberation process, and the presentation of 4 million Shs.<sup>53</sup>

The change in the post-1975 geopolitical map, ie the independence of Mozambique and Angola, necessitated a new appraisal of the liberation struggles. As R. Jaster argues an 'important result of this sudden shift in the regional power balance was the impetus it gave to local black-ruled states, augmented by two new members, to assume a more direct role in guiding Rhodesian national liberation groups, and helping them organise a more effective insurgency'.<sup>54</sup> Within this context, Tanzania became one of the architects of the FLS strategy of combining assistance to and support for the guerrilla struggles with diplomatic pressure on Western powers to play an active

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role in seeking a negotiated settlement for Rhodesia leading to majority rule. President Nyerere as the force of accommodation, played a substantial role in bringing both sides together. This was achieved due to his influence over Western leaders, particularly Carter, and the leaders of the liberation movements. Two interventions by Nyerere kept the Rhodesian negotiated settlement on track. In the first place, he called upon the USA and Britain to reject recognition of the 1978 internal settlement regime, while at the same time he initiated a resolution within the OAU calling for more material and financial assistance to the armed struggle waged by the Patriotic Front. Secondly, he urged Mugabe not to walk out of the Lancaster House negotiations, and resume the struggle. The end result was British supervised elections, and the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980.

Tanzania has also built upon its role within the FLS to become actively involved in regional cooperation agreements in Southern Africa. From the start the FLS has had the twin objectives of raising the general economic level of the regime and also reducing economic dependence upon South Africa. This economic dimension to regional security was given impetus in the first meeting of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), held in Tanzania in 1979. At the meeting four main developmental objectives were agreed upon:

- (1) reduction of economic dependence particularly on South Africa;
- (2) forging links to create a genuine and equitable integration;
- (3) mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national interstate and regional policies; and,
- (4) concerted actions to secure international cooperation within the framework of SADCC strategy for economic liberation.<sup>55</sup>

However, economic dependence on South Africa, deteriorating economic conditions, and the domestic instability of some front-line states, have limited the achievements of the SADCC. This is not to deny, however, that it has not achieved a prominent political, as well as economic position in Southern Africa. By 1986 it was a functioning organization with over 500 priority projects, involving resource targets of over \$5.500 million. Moreover, since 1981 it has increasingly denounced South African destabilization/aggression, and its Harare Consultative Conference, in 1986, issued calls for sanctions.<sup>56</sup>

To sum up, we have seen that Tanzania has maintained her position of non-alignment, and has also both at regional and global level set herself on a course leading to a more dynamic set of relationships. Incompatible developmental, political and security needs within the context of the EAC, and continuing Tanzanian support for the liberation of Southern Africa, have also allowed her to coordinate and consolidate her foreign policy within the context of the FLS and SADCC. However, involvement in Southern Africa, has also exposed some limits of Tanzanian foreign policy.

### **Limits of self-reliance and foreign policy—towards an adjustment**

As noted in the first part of this paper Tanzania's poor economic performance, and external diplomatic pressure in the 1960s, precipitated the determination

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that to hold on to an effective and independent foreign policy there had to be a major redefinition of the country's developmental objectives and strategies. However, this is all that can be said. Given Tanzania's poor economic record, and the circumstances within which Tanzanian foreign policy has to operate in Southern Africa, one could argue that the 1980s have provided yet another basis within which to adjust and restructure domestic and foreign policy.

As Hartman argues, any effectiveness or autonomy Tanzanian foreign policy might have allowed within the context of Southern Africa was not derived so much from Tanzanian influence, as from cooperation with other like-minded states.<sup>57</sup> The Nkomati Accords, therefore, question Tanzanian foreign policy patterns, and also constitute a challenge that requires adjustment and restructuring.

First, South Africa's overwhelming military superiority greatly restricts the potential for OFLS cooperation. Second, differences in the nature of regimes, along with the internal threats most front-line states are faced with, have detracted the OFLS from achieving a policy consensus, and have also forced the association to operate as a very loose group. Third, the internal and external economic dependence of the OFLS on South Africa is but another limitation on their ability to act independently.<sup>58</sup> With this background, and given the application of South African economic sanctions, and support for anti-regime movements, strategic members of the OFLS have had to turn to South Africa. In 1984, Mozambique signed a non-aggression pact with South Africa. Moreover, South African military penetration into Angola, and security deals with Swaziland, further question the consequences for Tanzanian foreign policy.<sup>59</sup> Tanzania could eventually be isolated from Mozambique and other Southern African countries, which have constituted her major area of foreign policy. South African strategy has created conflicting goals between radical/progressive ideals and the necessity to survive economically—as illustrated with the economic assistance the Nkomati Accords stipulate. Given that all OFLS members are dependent on South Africa, Tanzania's long term interests may conflict with SADC countries whose dependency may also push them into agreements similar to those of Nkomati. Moreover, one could also argue that South Africa's presence in the area, has been brought closer to Tanzania than ever before.

Finally, these factors also exemplify the link between weak economic structures and the danger to national security. As we have seen, Tanzania failed to achieve any self-sustained growth. In reality her internal surplus remained low, and the ensuing dependence on foreign aid—67.0 per cent of the GDP in 1985<sup>60</sup>—made the country vulnerable precisely when the soft-credit terms of the 1970s withered away with the impending economic crisis. Financial restrictions affected the major donor countries, and as a result bilateral aid was reduced. Accordingly, Tanzania was also obliged to negotiate multilateral agreements.

In line with these economic and geopolitical realities it seems that Tanzania is embarking upon a new turning point. Subject to negotiations and conditions set by the IMF, Tanzania in the 1980s increasingly questioned her post-1967 model of development. Despite Nyerere's initial criticism, socio-economic realities meant that Tanzania had to adjust its political strategy to the conditionalities of

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the IMF. Exports decreased by two-thirds between 1981 and 1985; net borrowing declined from TSH 1.2 billion in 1982 to none in 1985; and debt service as a percentage of exports increased from 11.7 per cent in 1981 to 60.9 per cent in 1984.<sup>61</sup> These factors could only point towards a multilateral solution. The drafting of a structural emergency plan emphasized this shift, for it substituted for the usual five year plan and depended upon a \$670 million IMF–World Bank loan. As a result of IMF proposals the Tanzanian government in the period 1981–86 instituted the following policies: stimulation of exports by devaluation and rationalization of the producer price scheme; reduction of budget deficits by strict control of public spending; liberalization of inter-regional trade; and substitution of village cooperatives by non-compulsory MKT cooperatives.

Together with these developments, Tanzanian political orientation in the 1980s, has also been conditioned by a debate within the party and government, between those who favour an opening to MKT forces—reformists—and those who wish to see the continuance of socialism—statists.<sup>62</sup> This debate also had a profound affect on the choice of a successor to Nyerere. Mwinyi was selected as a compromise candidate to the reformist Salim, and the statist Kawawa. Despite this debate it seems that reformism will continue to achieve its objectives, as illustrated by the IMF agreement in 1986, which allowed for a 60 per cent devaluation.

In terms of foreign policy it seems that an attempt is being made towards achieving greater regional, political and economic integration in Eastern Africa. In the 1980s Tanzania along with Uganda and Kenya, attempted to re-establish dialogue in order to maintain regional stability and cooperation. The long saga of the dissolution of the EAC ended in November 1983, as the three countries agreed in Arusha, to divide the old community's assets and liabilities, and to chart guidelines for future cooperation.<sup>63</sup> Cooperation modalities have been worked out in respect to transport, communications, tourism, scientific research, and joint programmes for financing. Tanzania also signed the Preferential Trade Agreement in April 1985. Finally, Nyerere on a state visit to Kenya in 1985, also stressed the need to relaunch the EAC on a new basis.

In conclusion, it is therefore clear, that economic and geopolitical realities have exposed the limits of Tanzanian self-reliance and foreign policy. In the first place, Tanzania has had to adjust its self-reliant strategy to the conditionalities upon which the IMF insisted. Second, circumstances within Southern Africa clearly illustrate that the potential for an effective Tanzanian foreign policy within the OFLS and SADCC is poor. While ideological and political ties may have allowed for a reorientation to the South, economic and geopolitical realities seem to be drawing Tanzania back to East Africa.

One, however, should not deny a remarkable consistency in Tanzanian foreign policy. Regardless of the changes examined above, there is little likelihood of any basic shift in the overall direction of Tanzania's foreign policy. As S. Chan has rightly argued 'the latter day image of Tanzania has been anchored in the reality of Tanzania's international relations towards Southern Africa'.<sup>64</sup> In the mid-1980s Tanzanian forces were sent into Mozambique to help FRELIMO against the South African backed rebels of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement. Tanzania also provided general security

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support for Seychelle's left-wing regime, which had been the target of a coup by South African mercenaries. The continuing willingness of the Tanzanian government to commit its forces to neighbouring countries despite economic and financial problems, is clearly an indication of the high priority that is placed on the liberation of Southern Africa. Moreover, Tanzania's recent participation in the Five Continents Peace Initiative also illustrates the desire to speak out from a non-aligned position on issues that threaten international stability.<sup>65</sup> In line with these developments, one can only conclude that Tanzania has 'demonstrated that the contemporary international system allows the weak nations a certain margin of autonomy and influence out of proportion to their economic and military strength'.<sup>66</sup>

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- 7 See Pratt, *op cit*, Ref 5, pp 445-446.
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- 11 See O. Nnoli, *Self-reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania*, NOK Publishers, 1978, p 107.
- 12 *Ibid*, p 112.
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- 14 Tanzania diversified its sources of aid in the period 1961-67, to include other countries outside the UK and the USA: China; Scandinavia; West Germany; Israel; Canada; and Yugoslavia. As a result, where as in 1961 exports to, and imports from the UK accounted for 35.8 per cent and 37.6 per cent of the total respectively, the equivalent figures for 1964 were 30.6 per cent and 25.3 per cent respectively. See O. Nnoli, *op cit*, Ref 1, p 6.
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- 16 Quoted in Pratt, *op cit*, Ref 5, p 446.
- 17 *Ibid*, p 447.
- 18 See S. Crouch, *op cit*, Ref 9, p 33.
- 19 Quoted in Pratt, *op cit*, Ref 5, pp 457-458.
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- 64 See S. Chan, review of S. Crouch, *New Zealand International Review*, Vol 13, No 3, 1988.
- 65 Bierman and Wago, *op cit*, Ref 60, p 94, would have us believe that the late Prime Minister of Sweden O. Palme, willing to balance parts of Tanzania's deficits under a plan in 1984, expected that his counterpart President Nyerere would gain relief from domestic troubles by participating in a world wide campaign in favour of nuclear disarmament. One should not forget that Sweden was Tanzania's leading donor in the 1970s, disbursing \$401 million, of which 89 per cent was in grant form. See S. Crouch, *op cit*, Ref 9, p 89.
- 66 See O. Nnoli, *op cit*, Ref 1, p 32.